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I. THE PROBLEM SITUATION 
A prominent characteristic of many firms in agriculture is the 
variability and uncertainty of their incomes. Objections to this insta­
bility have been voiced on many platforms and in many papers in our his­
tory, though the meaning has not always been precise. A farmer's net in­
come is highly variable, that is, it fluctuates greatly from year to year. 
At the same time it is more or less uncertain, tliat is, the size of the in­
come cannot often be predicted very far in advance. Not only is the farmer 
subject to wide swings in his income from year to year, but he cannot tell 
six months in advance wiiat his income is going to be. 
A. Components of Variable and Uncertain Income 
One of the more useful viays of classifying the elements that give 
rise to variable and uncertain incomes in agriculture is by the different 
areas or fields wiiere the variability and uncertainty arise or manifest 
themselves to the farmer. These areas are prices, yields, innovations, per­
sons, and institutions. 
A farmer faces variable and uncertain prices. Both the prices 
that he pays for the things he buys and the prices he receives for the 
products he sells are subject to change without much notice. One possi­
bility is that all prices advance or fall together and even this would 
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probably be attended by uncertainty. More likely, however, are situa­
tions Trfiere relative prices change. Costs may rise and prices received 
may fall or vice versa. Various cost prices may change relative to each 
other, and similarly with the prices of the things he sells. The farmer 
has inadequate information for predicting the changes in these price rela­
tionships . 
Farmers, like those in other industries, engage in transforming 
collections of resources into products which they use or sell. In many 
industries these relationships or rates at v/hich resources are transformed 
can be described within fairly narrow limits. That is, it is known v/ith 
considerable accuracy that a given amount of resources of various kinds 
will produce a given amount of finished products. In agriculture the 
yield from a set of resources seems much more inaccurately known. This 
is not because the fundamental transformation relationships in farming 
are fickle but because the farmer does not have all his resources under 
precise control. Agriculture is a biological enterprise, and much of it 
is also subject to meteorological factors. Man has made great progress 
in biology and even a little in meteorology, but a great many unforeseen 
events occur to make agricultural yields quite variable and quite uncer­
tain. Given the best known varieties, breeds, feeding rates, seeding 
rates, disease and pest controls, and other cultural and management prac­
tices, crop yields and livestock yields are still subject to diseases, 
pests, and the vagaries of the weather in varying degrees. 
Reference was made above to the "best knovvn" practices. These are 
not static either. Innovations are continually being made in methods, 
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breeds, and equipment. Considerable investment is involved in adapting 
to nevT technology and it is never certain in advance whether the new will 
be better or more profitable than the old, or how soon it will be super­
seded by something still better. 
Agriculture still involves persons, and persons are social animals 
living in a social environment. Besides being a person himself, the farmer 
uses the personal services of many other people. The continual flow of 
these and his own services are not known with certainty. People die, their 
health may change, marital status may change, they may commit various un­
ethical acts, or betray a trust. With himself included, the farmer is 
never certain hov/ persons will affect his farming enterprise. 
In addition to persons and personalities, many of the services 
that farming and living require are performed by institutions. Banks, 
churches, governments, schools, insurance companies, and customs, to men­
tion a fevT, all have their impact on the farmer and his farm. Changes in 
policies, laws, and customs cannot be seen far in advance. Actions in­
itiated on the basis of one set of conditions may come to fruition under 
another set, Miich, if they could have been knoivn in advance, might have 
indicated other actions as most desirable. 
B. Critical Impacts of Variable and Uncertain Incomes 
In the preceding section some of the outstanding elements of vari­
able and uncertain incomes have been set forth. But is this variability 
and uncertainty undesirable? Is it bad? '.Vhat is the problem? In order 
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to isolate the problem, if any, we must investigate the impacts of this 
variability and uncertainty on the farmer, that is, how and in wliat ways 
it affects him. Two main types of impacts will be presented. One is 
the sacrifice of income (as seen afterwards) because of incorrect expecta­
tions, and the other is the danger of insolvency from extreme income vari­
ability. 
In most cases, a farmer has to make decisions and commit resources 
before he has accurate infonaation regarding the outcome. If v;e assume 
that he tries to make his net income as large as possible over time, in 
some years he will employ too many resources, in some years not enougli. 
Or he may find that he applied them in the vfrong proportions. In many 
years his income will be less than it could have been had he known every­
thing in advance. The income lost in this way, and the costs involved in 
making adjustments, may be considerable. 
Another impact of the variable and uncertain nature of farm in­
comes is the danger of insolvency. In some parts of agriculture, income 
is so variable from year to year that tiiere is considerable danger of re­
ceiving a negative net income on the low siiring, or more frequently, not 
high enough to provide a decent minimum living for the farm family and 
service fixed capital charges. This is in spite of the possibility that 
the average level of income from the farm over time may be quite adequate 
and satisfactory, though this knov^ ledge may be of little solace to a farmer 
who has become bankrupt. Uncertainty is involved here also because, if all 
magnitudes relevant to ttie committing of resources had been known in ad­
vance, other alternative courses of action might have been taken, perhaps 
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not so profitable on the average, but possibly providing the continuity 
necessary for achieving incomes in future years. 
C. Focus of This Study 
In the foregoing pages there have been hints of many problems# 
Variability and uncertainty of farm income arise fran many causes and have 
their impact on the farm business in several ways. For tliis study an at­
tempt v/ill be made to select an important and relevant aspect of this whole 
broad set of problems. It is proposed to make this selection relevant for 
conditions of dry-land farming in North Dakota, although it will have con­
siderable application generally throughout the Great Plains. 
Of the five conceptual areas presented in section A which give 
rise to variability and uncertainty, crop yield variability is chosen for 
this study. This is not to say that uncertainty arising from changes in 
prices, innovations, persons, or institutions is not important. It is 
sijnply to say that, while all these areas are of considerable importance, 
it is believed that crop .yield variability is a critical factor contribut­
ing to farmers' income variability in North Dakota from year to year. 
Coefficients of variation of county average wheat yields in North 
Dakota, as compiled for the years 1926-i|8,^  range to as high as per cent, 
and more than two-thirds of the counties were above $0 per cent. Being 
county averages, it is very likely the figures represent many farmers whose 
yields varied even more than this. 
U^. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Variability of Wheat 
Yields. 1901. mimeo. p. E>'0. 
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The whole picture is not shovm by coefficients of variation. It 
has been observed that years of similar yields, either above or below 
average, have occurred in runs. 1^ /hether the occurrence of these runs is 
significantly different from what might be expected in a random series is 
a moot question. The fact remains that they do occur, and that they are 
largely unpredictable. For North Dakota as a whole, during the 70-year 
period of 1879-19U8, there were three separate periods when wheat yields 
were above average for a run of three or more years, and two of these runs 
lasted nine years each. In four separate periods, yields ran below average 
for three or more years in a rowj one of these was five and another tv/elve 
years long. The other periods were of two years or less, including nine 
times when the yields alternated above and below average each year,^  
In section B two categories of the impacts of income variability 
and uncertainty v^ ere indicated. For purpose of this study a selection will 
also be made here, again choosing one that is of critical significance in 
North Dakota dry-land farming. The danger of insolvency has been selected. 
The problem of reducing the amount of non-realized potential income through 
improving expectations and decision-malcing techniques is one that is com­
mon to most of agriculture and even to most industries, and much attention 
has been devoted to this in recent years. The problem of bankruptcy, when 
it occurs through no fault of the entrepreneur and with no pairbicular bene­
fit to the creditors, is a critical one in North Dakota and the Great 
Plains generally and has not received as much explicit attention as the 
other. 
H^. L. Walster and P. A, Nystuen. North Dakota i'ftieat Yields, N, 
D, Agr, Exp, Sta, Bui, 3^ 0, 19U8. 
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In summary, then, it is proposed that this study focus its emphasis 
on the problem of insolvency in North Dakota farming and the important con­
tributing factor of annual variations in crop yields, especially those 
which occur beyond the control of current average management ability. Part 
of the problem >Till be to show that farmers in areas of high yield vari­
ability are sensitive to the risk of bankruptcy, and part ^ vill be to ex­
plore farmers' motivations in the actions that they take to adjust to the 
situation. 
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II. CONTRIBUTIOM OF ECONOMICS RfiGA-aDING THE FOlif,nJLATION OF 
FARMRS' OBJi'lCTIVES AKD KATIONALITY OF BKIAVIOR 
When attempting to gain an understanding of a problem, certain 
assumptions have to be made as to the nature of the framework or setting. 
Moreover, successful solution of the problem may depend on the extent to 
wliich these assumptions are realistic and representative of the actual 
situation. The reference here is to assumptions about farmers' objectives 
and rational behavior in the light of these objectives. 
From a multitude of problems affecting fanners, one, or at least 
one subset, has been chosen: the variability and uncertainty of farm in­
come with its roots in crop yield variability and its impact in the perils 
of bankruptcy. Instrumental towards an improvement in the situation is an 
examination of farmer's basic objectives and behavior. Some relevant 
highlights from the record of economic analysis will be presented so that 
the contribution of this discipline to our problem can be assessed, 
A. Static Economic Theory 
A common assumption throughout the development of economic sci­
ence was that economics as such is not responsible for peoples' objectives, 
goals, or ends. Once given these objectives, the role of economics lay in 
pointing out the most economical means of achieving them. Often the econ­
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omists were not provided vfith a clear and operative statement of objec­
tives, and it fell to them to substitute ^ stiat they thought yrere reason­
able goals and then to work out their analyses in relation to them. Natu­
rally, their selection of objectives v/as influenced by the nature of their 
tools and analytical concepts. While this was defensible in many cases, 
there was a tendency for a set of objectives to become commonly accepted 
with little criticism. Some of our techniques and concepts developed on 
these grounds. 
Until the 1920's or later, most economic thought centered around 
analysis that was essentially static. Relationships betvreen variables were 
considered constant and precise, and perfect knov^ ledge was assumed. Under 
these conditions, the goal of maximum profits for the firm and maximum util­
ity for the individual or household seemed quite reasonable. By a neat and 
logical process, these' objectives v/ere transformed into a set of marginal 
conditions which were to be the criteria for rational behavior. 
There are types of problems mere these assumptions serve a useful 
purpose, but at the same time their shortcomings have become increasingly 
apparent. An outstanding example is the case at hand in i^ eat Plains dry 
farming, vmere yield and income variability is of critical importance. 
In this setting, the motive of maximum annual profits or maximum 
average profits over time avails little if the farmer is unable to remain 
solvent. Rational behavior under the profit motive in the static sense 
may not result in greatest actual i-ealized profits. If one of a series 
of annual incomes is so low as to force the individual into bankruptcy, 
the opportunity for participating in the rest of the series may be lost. 
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or only regained at considerable cost, i'or the individual i'arm, the basis 
for predicting crop yields six months or even three months in advance is 
extremely meagre. For prices, the predicT.ability is a little better, but 
even here tiie price received will bear no recognizable relation to the size 
of the crop^  making a high price iivith a high yield or low price with low 
yi.eld just as likely as any other combination. 
It vras also customary throughout much of bhe development of eco­
nomics to separate firm analysis from household analysis, the only inter­
action being in the market place. No one denied that entrepreneurs are al­
so consumers and perhaps even heads of households. But in an exchange 
economy, the consumption of one's ovm produce was considered of little im­
portance and so a dichotomy arose. Again, in some types of industries and 
firms, this doss not do a very great injustice to the facts, but it should 
not be stretched to include many parts of agriculture, especially those 
where income variability ^ vith the ever-present threat of bankruptcy is 
present. Under these conditions, a farmer vmo has not studied formal eco­
nomics may never think of separating his family and their consumption needs 
from the rest of the fai*m business. To him it is not a "firm" and a "house 
hold," but a "farm," with minimum living expenses as important as seed ex­
penses. P'amily living has to be considered along with gasoline bills, mort 
gage payments, and taxes. A farmer probably vd.ll not consider his income 
problem solved when his income is just great enough to cover the expenses 
of his "agricultural firm." 
Some of the legacies of the old, essentially static economics 
have been presented, and thair inadecjuacy •ivith respect to our present 
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problem has been pointed out. A scheme of analysis using a set of equili­
brium conditions based on profit maximization and a dichotomy between firm 
and household does not fit oar needs. VVhile North Dakota farmers may de­
sire profits as much as anyuody, they cannot pursue this exclusively or 
they may be eliminated from the enterprise or industry. The concept of 
equilibrium, even moving equilibrium, hardly suits these farmers. They 
are continually facing crises, either at hand, or just over the horizon 
with unknovm probabilities. They have to make adjustments continually to 
nevT situations, moving first one way and then the other. The famer, under 
these conditions, cannot disassociate his family and household from the 
farm as a business because the one can hardly exist without the other. 
B. Dynamic Economic Theory 
In the static theory of the firm, economists typically made several 
simplifying assumptions. Production or transformation functions vrere as­
sumed precise and stable and therefore subject to accurate prediction. 
Prices of factors and products were assumed stable and known throuf^ iout 
a production period. In the last 30 years, these assumptions have become 
increasingly suspect becautje it was apparent that these magnitudes were 
not precise, stable, and predictable Vfith certainty. 
In 1921 i'rofessor Frank H. Knight^  set forth his suspicion of the 
earlier assumption, and attempted to lay the foundation for a dynamic the­
ory under conditions of uncertainty. He divided the field into risk and 
%rank H. Knight. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston. Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1921. p. 197-263. 
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uncertainty. Under "risk" he placed those instances where the distribu­
tion of outcomes for a set of events is knovm, even though the outcome of 
a particular event may not. In this case, the uncertainty is not really 
uncertainty at all because it is measurable, and hence insurable, and 
hence budgetable. Perfect planning is not precluded under conditions of 
"risk," He restricted the meaning of uncertainty to those instances where 
the probability distribution of the outcomes of a set of events is not 
known and, therefore, not measurable or easily insurable. 
Knight offered two types of measures for reducing uncertainty and 
the impact of uncertainty—grouping and specialization. By grouping situ­
ations wiiich are similar in character, some of the benefits of insurance 
may be gained. Shifting the uncertainty to specialists who are better 
prepared and equipped is the other alternative. These individuals may 
also be able to make use of the grouping principle by building up a vfhole 
portfolio of various uncertainties or risks. 
1 
Hicks introduced the dynamic aspect by dating the inputs and 
outputs. Inputs of a factor entering the productive process at different 
times vrere considered different factors. Outputs of a product produced 
at different times were considered different products. Anticipations of 
future prices were still assumed single-valued, that is, predictable 
with certainty. From here the analysis proceeded as under the static 
case, 
A g eneralization involving removal of some other assumptions was 
J^. R. Hicks, Value and Capital. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1939. 
p. 115-120. 
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presented by Tintner.^  He treated cases where the transformation func­
tions are not completely known and where price anticipations are not known 
with certainty either. The individual may view each of these uncertainties 
as a probability distribution. But these probabilit,/ distributions of the 
anticipated events may not be expected with certainty either. In this case 
there may be a probability distribution of the probability distributions 
of the particular variable, or perhaps even distributions of a higher order. 
Hovrever, at some level, the individual is able to form a probability dis­
tribution of anticipated total discounted net profits. How will the indi­
vidual evaluate this information, and hovf vdJ.1 he behave if he is faced 
with sets of discounted net profits and their probabilities? Tintner in­
troduces an uncertainty preference functional v/hich the individual tries 
to maximize. This expresses the individual's preferences, with respect to 
the probability distribution of anticipated total discounted net profits, 
in terms of the mean, standard deviation, and skewness, etc. The amounts 
of factors hired and outputs produced -ffill be those amounts which will max­
imize his risk preference functional. 
2 Meanvriiile Hart took a sli^ tly different approach. He visualized 
the strategic nature of planning and held that the entrepreneur's funda­
mental means of meeting uncertainty is the postponement of decisions until 
more information becomes available, 
. That is to say, he tries to preserve flexibility in his business 
G^erhard Tintner, The Theory of Production under Nonstatic Condi­
tions, Journal of Political ISconomy, $0: 61t^ -667, 19U2. 
A^, 0, Hart, jlnticipations, Uncertainty, and Dynamic Planning, 
New York. Augustus ^ >1. Kelley, Inc. 19^ 1. 
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plan and in his organization, depending on the cost. The individual be­
gins a production period with a provisional plan in mind. He visualizes 
the dispersion of possible prices and coefficients about the expected 
values to become greater as he looks fui'tlier into tho future. As the date 
to irvhich they apply approaches, he hopes to reduce that dispersion of his 
estimates because more information will be available. Hence, he vri.ll 
postpone decisions as long aa he can and also keep his plans and business 
reasonably flexible, so tiiah changes can be made to take advantage of new 
conditions. 
The foregoing authors and their theories represent some of the more 
important lines of theoretical development that bear on nonstatic problems. 
Most of them used the goal of maximum profits, though most of them would 
probably agree with Knight that "the mental operations by vfhich ordinary 
practical decisions are made are very obscure . . These contributions 
have a definite logical appeal, but ai-e operationally rather difficult to 
apply and quantify in practd.cal situations. Nearly all economists have 
been plagued with the choice of assumptions pertaining to the objectives 
of the individual or firm. As one tries to make his analysis more dynamic, 
it becomes increasingly evident that the ordinary maximum profits assump­
tion is unsatisfactory. Maxijnura profits or net revenue are desirable, of 
course, but this objective may not be feasible iNiaen the entrepreneur does 
not control all the factors. 
For a long time economists have wondered wiiy many firms, such as 
in agriculture, were not larger. Observations also indicated that for 
1 Kni^ t, op, cit, p, 211, 
greatest profits, tlie proportion of capital to labor in agriculture was 
far too lovf, and should be increased. As an explanation, Kalecki^  intro­
duced his principle of increasing risk which says that the rate of risk 
increases v;ith the amount of investment, because at a given time one 
would have to borrow capital to expand, thus decreasing one's er^ uity so 
that there is an increased likelihood of loss of control by an unfortui-
tous tui-n of events. This is important for our problem because it indi­
cates that fear of "loss of control," in other words, insolvency, may be 
a consideration that may override the profit motive in risky situations. 
2 Boulding, also dissatisfied with the shortcomings of the static 
marginal analysis with its emphasis on income, reconstructed economic the­
ory in terms of the balance sheet instead. He considers the preferences 
of the firm with respect to types of assets and to asset i-atios (ratio of 
the amount of one type of asset to the total). This opens the way for 
study of the magnitudes as they affect preservation of the firm, 
<5 I 
Professors Heady and Schickele have also indicated that firms, 
at certain stages of their development or under conditions of great uncer­
tainty, may believe that the objective of security or siurvival is paramount 
and be v/illing to sacrifice immediate income for this purpose, 
%, Kalecki. The Principle of Increasing Risk, Economica. U (new 
ser.): liitO-UU7. 1937. 
2 Kenneth E. Boulding, A Reconstruction of Economics. New York, 
John Vtfiley auid Sons, Inc, 19^ 0, p, 26-^ 0. 
E^arl 0. Heady. Economics of Agricultural Production and liesource 
Use. New York. Prentice-Hall, Inc, 195^ » p. !p01-505, 
R^ainer Schickele. Farmers Adaptations to Income Uncertainty. 
Journal of Farm Economics, 32* 356-37U. 1950, 
16 
In recent years there have been a number of studies made in agri-
cultui'al economics enlarging and extending the contributions to dynamics 
briefly outlined above. Many of these have probed the methods and mental 
processes by viririich farmers form anticipations and raal:e decisions on the 
basis of incomplete information. V^ hile they have not dealt with the par­
ticular problem of this thesis, tiiey have some methodological implica­
tions, and tv/o have been selected for comment here. 
1 
Brownlee and Gainer in lov/a, by means of a survey, explored the 
formulation of price and yield anticipations and the relation of these 
anticipations to production plans. Among other things, tlie farmers were 
asked (in March) v/hat they thought tlie most probable price for corn would 
be in December. Later on in the interview, they were asked to state the 
lowest price at vrhich they would contract now for delivery in December. 
Nearly all the farmers answering the question named a price as high or 
higher than their anticipated price, which, on the face of it, would indi­
cate a preference for uncertainty, though the authors, to their credit, 
discount this conclusion. 
2 In a later study in Illinois i'lfilliams asked similar questions and 
received similar answers. He concludes definitely that farmers have a 
negative certainty preference since the contract price had to be higher 
than the expected price, or even higher than the upper limit of the ex­
pected range of prices. 
0^. H. Brownlee and Walter Gainer. Fanners' Price Anticipations 
and the Role of Uncertainty in Farm Planning. Journal of Farm Economics. 
31: 266-275. 19i;9. 
B. Williams. Price Expectations and Reactions to Uncertainty 
by Farmers in Illinois. Journal of Farm Economics. 33' 20-39* 1951• 
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These exaraples havo been presented to illustrate the dangers of 
getting nonsense results from asking hypothetical questions. To a person 
untraiiied in abstract thinking, there may be no correspondence between 
reactions to hypothetical situations and reactions to real situations. 
It is also questionable v<tiether any certain situation can ever be truly 
1 
equivalent to an uncertain one, Lange describes an indifference func­
tion in which high uncertain incomes are equivalent to lower but certain 
ones. This indifference curve approach for evaluating individuals' prefer­
ences regarding uncertainty bearing seems not entirely realistic. It in­
fers a "once and for all" type of decision, with no provisions for revi­
sions through time as more infoi-mation becomes available, and suggests 
that"equivalent" in terms of preferences means "equivalent" in terms of 
action. It is doubtful if a truly uncertain situation can be reduced to 
a certain situation as implied in Lange's appi'oach. 
Similarly, hy][3othetical and other sure-chance questions relating 
to uncertainties ai-e dangerous things on VYhich to judge behavior. It is 
quite possible, however, that something of the sort could be used to study 
the psychology of ansv/ering hypothetical questions. 
The examples of this chapter have been selected to indicate the 
broad lines of development of economic theories and empirical studies that 
relate directly to the problem of this thesis. The inadequacies illustrated 
were the maximum profits objective, the separation of fii-m and household, 
the concept of certainty equivalents, and the use of h^ /^pothetical questions 
in intei-views. On the positive side, the most useful development for our 
O^scar -Ijange, Price lilexibility and Employment, Bloomington, 
The Principia i^ ress. 19liU, p, 30-31, 
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pui-pose was the provring r(3.-'.lization that an objective along the lines of 
firm security or preservation was nc?eded for the develoi;raent of a realistic 
theory of rational choice and behavior. This suggests that ander conditions 
of uncertainty such as in the Great Plains, the farmer has a tvcofold objec­
tive in his farming; One is the fairly reasonable hypothesis that he tries 
to maximize his income, v;iiile the other is that he tries to avoid insol­
vency. These two goals co-exist, ift-ith perhaps one or the other dominant, 
depending on conditions at various times. At times they may be co-opera­
tive? at others competitive. Both are essential to a satisfactory expla­
nation of rational behavior in agriculture. Under such conditions, uncer­
tainty is mors than just a cost deductible from income. It also contains 
the danger of bankruptcy mich would disrupt the continuity necessary for 
maximum profits. 
To illustrate the interaction of the tvro goals, an analogy may be 
useful. Suppose a person pays a considerable sum for the privilege of 
playing a penny-tossing g;une Mrith a coin loaded slightly in his favor. In 
the long run, his objective is to win as many pennies as possible, and the 
odds (again in the long run) are that he will be successful. But the load 
on the coin and the long-run odds do not make his success a certainty. In 
fact, if he starts with a very small reserve, he could easily become bank­
rupt after the first few times and would no longer be able to participate 
in the game anddi'aw the fruits of the favorable odds. When his reserve is 
dovm to one or two pennies say, he may concentrate entirely on the short-
run objective of solvencj; in staying in the game, and may even be willing 
to sacrifice the chances of part of his future profit probabilities if it 
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will assist him in the present. If he has a family to maintain and some 
fixed charges to meet, his short-run objective may gain complete ascend­
ancy till the emergency is past. On the other hand, the larger his begin­
ning fortune or the larger his reserves become through a run of good luck, 
the greater the likelihood that he will be able to withstand an unfavorable 
run in the future and the more he will concentrate on the maxim-am income 
objective. 
As in all analogies the implications are limited, but as far as we 
have gone they are obvious vj-ith respect to farming under conditions of 
great uncertainty. In agriculture there is the further consideration that 
the very "load on the coin" is itself partljr a function of past outcomes. 
That is, in a'-^ riculture there are the twin problems of capital accumula­
tion and scale. This vforks in two ways. After a number of successes, 
capital has accumulated so that the scale of the enterprise can be increased 
for the purpose of greater efficiency and profits. That is, with greater 
efficiency, a farmer can cover costs v^ ith a lower yield, thus improving his 
chances for success. At the same time, the increased capital and equity 
itself acts as a reserve which lessens the danger of bankruptcy. If nega­
tive incomes do occur, the increased efficiency makes a recovers'" more like­
ly and more speedy. In these two v/ays, successes increase the likelihood 
of further successes. The problem faced by low-capital farmers is how to 
I 
stay in the game long enough so that they may experience enough good years 
to put them across this "hump" in capital accumulation vrtiere the odds seem 
to be work-ing for them instead of against them. A farmer with a small 
amount of capital may find progress extremely difficult and uncertain, 
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because his critical limit of survival in terras of yields is higher. 
This makes bankruptcy more likely and recovery more difficult and slov/ 
even in years of high yields. 
Mention vms made before of the possibility that the dual objectives 
of maximum income and security were sometimes competitive. There are tv/o 
senses in ivhich this can hold. One is in the capital accumulation frame-
vrork as described in the last paragraph. When capital and equity are 
small, the tvro objectives may be in conflict, Where capital is large, the 
following of the profit objective may also maximise the security objective. 
The other type of interaction between the tvfo objectives relates to manage­
ment practices. For instance, in certain types of farming, diversifica­
tion of enterprises may not only provide security and stability of income, 
but may also be the most efficient system in terms of profits. In other 
cases where a monoculture xr, most efficient in the long run, deliberate 
diversification for security's sake may reduce profit expectations. 
It should be made clear that the foregoing propositions exist in 
the setting of capital rationing, both external and internal, and a credit 
system based on rigid repajment schedules. It is this that makes the ques­
tion of reserves and capital accumulation of such critical importance. 
Credit institutions, with their traditional rigid repayment schedules, and 
resultijmg experience ivith default, have imposed rule-of-thurab limits on the 
amount a farmer may borrovT, usually related to the collateral or equity 
that he has to offer. Thus the fewer resources a farmer ovms, the fewer 
he is able to borrow. The lower a farmer's equity, trie less likely is he 
able to protect it. Joint stock organiaation, vjhich has been able to 
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spread the risk in many parts of industry and commerce, has never taken 
hold in t.he riskier areas of agriculture in any important vfay. 
Let us sroranarize the factors which determine the relative freights 
an individual will assign to the tvro objectives. First should be men­
tioned the farmer's own personality (other things being equal some people 
are more conservative than others) and his faiiily responsibilities. The 
amount of capital and reseinres he commands, or scale of business, vj-ill be 
important as v/sll as his equity and the degree of encumbrance. This in 
turn is related to the availability of credit and the terms \inder v/hich 
it is to te repaid. Also affecting his views and decisions will be the 
inherent derjree of variability or uncertainty (in our case, weather and 
crop yields), that pervades the region, and related to this is the basic 
opportunity for efficient diversification that exists. These and other 
factors and the components of correspondintj rational behavior will be dis­
cussed further in the next chapter on hypothesis formulation. 
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III. HYPOTHESIS FORMLATION; ADAPTATION OF THE FARM TO 
CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY A.RISINO FROM EXTREME 
YIFIiD VARIABILITY 
Having preaentecl the problem in Chapter I, and having examined 
the contribution ol" economic theory to tiiis in Chapter II, several hy­
potheses are suggested here that describe the interaction of the dual 
objectives in farmors' anticipations and the coiiiponents of rational be­
havior adjuatinonts in uncertainty situations. 
First, some items of procedure should be indicated, i'he agri-
c-.iltural firm and household v/ill be considered as a unit called the "farm," 
and the i/ord "farnier" .vill be used to designate the entrepreneur combined 
"•.Yith farm-household consumer. Since there is some doubt as to vraether the 
uncertainties involved, namely crop yields, have the aspects of true risk 
or not, in Knight's sense, the word "risk" will be used as a synonym for 
"uncertainty." Thus, vee can use tiio expression "high-risk area" meaning 
a fanning area where the variability or uncertainty of yields is exbra-
ordinarily high under present culture and i-cnowledge. A "high-risk-area 
farmer" is one w^ io farms in such an ai-ea. In general, the hypotheses will 
be stated in a positive manner even though testing (Chapter IV) requires 
the null form. The hypotheses vrill be of two major categories. Primary 
hypotheses vdll be comparative stabements related to motives and adjust­
ments as betvfeen areas v/ith different degrees of yield risk or uncertainty. 
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Secondary hypotheses vfill be comparative statements related to motives 
and adjustments caused by differing degrees of vulnerability aside from 
differences in area-yield risk or uncertainty. Under each of the two 
categories, there will be a considerable number of extensions to the 
various items of motivation and adjustment. 
In connection iirith the farmer's dual objective of solvency and 
maximum profits, the concepts of "vulnerability" factors and "security" 
practices have been introduced. Vulnerability factors are those funda­
mental or independent characteristics of bhu farms in an area, in addi­
tion to, or even a result of, yield variability, wnich are more or less 
beyond the practical control of the average farmer, but which place him 
in a hazardous position with respect to his likelihood of becoming bank­
rupt or insolvent. "Practical conti-ol" is interpreted in relation to 
what is normally feasible in an ai-ea where trial and error over the years 
has pretty well determined the best-adapted practices, l-'or example, the 
choice of whether or not to raise wheat in a specialized wheat-growing 
area is excluded from the practical control of most fanners. Another ex­
ample is the amount of a farmer's equity or net worth. This too is large­
ly beyond his control, at least in the short run. 
Security practices, on the other hard, are those farm character­
istics over which the farmer has a consiasrable measure of control and 
wiiich he can change more or less at will in accordance with his current 
objective. They are measures that will give him some degree of security 
from bankruptcy and may or may not give hjjn a higher income expectancy. 
For example, it is within the power of his choice to decide whether or not 
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he wants to take crop insurance, or v/iiethor or not he wants to maintain 
part of his assets in the form of liquid reserves or invest them in some­
thing more productive A'ita respect to income. 
The sets of hypotheses tiiat follovf in the next two sections are 
bused on several propositions developed from study and observation of 
farmers in relation to uncertainty in the high-risk area of the Great 
Plains. These creneral propositions are: 
(1) Farmers have a positive certainty preference or aversion to risk, 
Pruna facie evidence to the contrary, turned up in such studies 
1 2 
as those by Hrownlee and Gainer, and '.'<illiams, is spurious, a 
result of inadequate research techniques. 
(2) Farmers take positive actions to achieve security, even at some 
cost, but not if the cost is too hiwh, 
(3) The more vulnerable farmers are, the more security measures they 
will practice. 
(14) Various security practices are to some extent substitutable. 
A. Primary Hypotheses 
The primary hypotheses relate to the difference in farmer's motives 
and behavior as a result of differences in the degree of crop jrield vari­
ability assuming* the same average yield over the years. Two major primary 
hypotheses are presented, each with a number of extensions. The various 
1 Brovmlee and Gainer, op. cit. 
2 
w illiams. op. c it. 
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items of oxtension are not all independent of each other but are analyt­
ically useful nonetheless. 
1. High-risk area fai-mers, on the average, are more vulnerable-) than 
lovf-risk area farmers with respect to 12 vulnerability measures 
as follov;s: (in each case, the comparison I'.'ill be for hi'^ h-i'-isk 
area farmers as compared v/ith low-risk area farmers.) 
liigh-risk area farms or farmers— 
(a) will have a lower equity or employ a smaller amount of self-owned 
capital. 
(b) will have a lower ratio of equity to total farm assets. 
Fai'mers in a high-risk area accumulate capital with considerable 
difficulty unless they strike a run of good years at the right time. At 
any pai'ticular time, the amount of capital a farmer owns or his total equity 
is beyond his power of choice in any practical way. Hence, items (a) and 
(b) suggest that higli-risk area farmers are deficient in this respect as 
compared with fcirmers in an area of lowei' risk. . 
» \ 
(c) will have a higher ratio of value of real estate and machinery to 
total farm assets. 
(d) will have less livestock. 
(e) will iiave a lov/er ratio of amount of livestock to total fam assets. 
Items (c), (d), and (e) reflect the proposition ttiat the keeping 
of a livestock enterprise as a supplement to grain grovfing depends more on 
the intierent natural and physical characteristics of the area than upon 
the desire for any security value provided by the diversity. That is to 
say, v/nile high-risk area farmers may be expected to keep some livestock 
for complementary or diversity reasons, tiiis practice will be rather lim­
ited. Ahere precipitation is highly variable, around a mean that is not 
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much above minimum needs, feed supplies will also be variable and tlio live­
stock may turn into a liability. Consequently, it is postulated tiiat there 
will be less livestock in taa aigh-risk area and that livestock will con­
stitute a smaller share of the total farm assets. 
(f) v/ill have a smaller tottil farm acreage. 
(g) v/ill have a greater wheat acreage. 
(h) ivill have a smaller acreage of pasture and waste. 
(i) will have a greater ratio of wheat and flax acreage (casli crop 
acreage) to total crop acreage. 
Items (f) through (i) are the converse of items (c), (d), and (e) 
to some extent, .i^ ecaase of the inherent characteristics of such an area, 
Hpecialiised cash crops may still be the safest enterprise, considering the 
nature of livestock feed reiiuirements. In this sense it is reasonable to 
say that farmers in sach areas have no real choice in the matter. 
(j) will have a smaller ratio of those who feel they could keep their 
livestock in case of a drought j'ear, to those vfho feel they would have to 
reduce their livestoclc, 
(k) will have a smaller number of farmers iviio feel they have a reliable 
or drought-resistant supply of slough hay. 
(l) y/ill have a smaller nuinbsr of farmers who feel they could survive 
a year of complete cash crop failure. 
3omo evidence for the preceding propositions v/ith respect to live­
stock enterprises and stability of feed supply y/jj-l be sought under hyifjoth-
esss (j), (k), and (1). These relate directly to the reliability of feed 
supplies under different conditions of yield variability. 
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2, High-risk area farmers practice more security measures than low-
risk area farmers, with respect to 25 items, as follows: 
(a) will borrow less or have smaller total liabilities. 
(b) will have fewer and smaller farm mortgages. 
(c) will have fewer and smaller chattel mortgages. 
(d) will have done less borroiridng for current running expenses in 
recent years. 
(e) vrt.ll have fewer and smaller current liabilities. 
(f) will have a lower ratio of total liabilities to total farm assets. 
(g) will have a lower ratio of current liabilities to value of live­
stock and reserves. 
(h) will have a lower ratio of total liabilities to total equity. 
Under security practices are classed those items over which the 
individual farmer has some practical choice and control. In his financial 
structure, the presumption is that due to risk aversion (in the setting of 
conventional rigid credit repayment terms), the farmer in the high-risk 
area will try to minimize his debt load. The various manifestations of 
this motive suggest the eight measures above, items (a) through (h). 
(i) will have more rented land. 
(j) will have a larger ratio of rented land to total farm assets. 
(k) will have a larger amount of feed and grain reserves on hand. 
(l) will be more numerous who believe they have sufficient feed and 
grain on hand for one vdiole year in advance. 
(m) will have a greater amount of liquid reserves, that is, cash, bank 
accounts, bonds, et cetera. 
(n) will have a greater amount of total reserves on hand both physical 
and liquid. 
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(o) will have a greater ratio of total reserves to total farm assets, 
(p) will be more with nonfavm income. 
Items (i) and (j) suggest that in a high-risk area more of the 
land factoi's v/ill oe obtained by x'enting so that the risks Yfill be divided 
between the operator and the landlord. If high-rislc-area fanners, as in­
dicated in items (k) through (o), have a positive certainty preference they 
will prefer to have more of their assets, and a greater proportion of 
their assets, in the form of reserves of various kinds both physical and 
monetary that can be dravm on in time of adversity. Farmers interested 
only in tlie static concept of maximum profits would likely put these re­
serves to some immediately productive use. Actually, reserves held as a 
cushion against risk are in a sense productive: they produce security. 
.\nother type of reserve is nonfarm income as stated in item (p). 
(q) v^ ill have less flax acreage, 
(r) ivill have more summeifallow acreage. 
(s) ivill iiave a greater z-atio of fallow acreage to total cultivated 
acreage. 
(t) v;ill do more weed spraying, 
(u) will practice more strip cropping. 
Othei- measures that a security-minded farmer may practice are those 
relating to his fanning methods and cultural techniques. These are stated 
in items (q) tiirough (u). While cash crops have been indicated as an in­
herent charactex'istic, the farmer still can exercise choice as to which 
cash crop he raises. Flax is generally considered to be a riskier crop 
than vmeat and presumably less of it will be grovm in a high-risk area. 
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It is also reasonable to expect that high-risk-area fanners vvilladapt to 
cultural practices that will help to make a good crop more certain, hence 
there will be more summerfallow, more weed spraying, and more strip cropping. 
(v) will be more numerous who have ever taken hail insurance and more 
who have hail insurance currently. 
(IT) vdll be vfilling to pay a higher premium to guarantee farm operating 
costs, and a higher premium to guarantee all minimum costs including farm 
operating costs, living costs, and debt payments, 
(x) will be more disposed to join a rain-making scheme. 
High-risk-area farmers might be expected to be more insurance-minied 
if they are interested in security since this will help to guarantee them 
part of their income. One would expect them to subscribe more heavily to 
hail insurance and crop insurance as stated in items (v) and (w). Item (x) 
on rain-making suggests that they may have a propensity to grasp at straws 
if there is any chance that it may help their yield problem. 
(y) will be related to their landlords in greater numbers. 
•L«astly, it is suggested in (y), that another arrangement that can 
provide some security is to be related to your landlord. Such a person may 
be more understanding and more lenient than a nonrelated person or stranger. 
B. Secondary ilypothesea 
Two sets of hypotheses, each with their extensions, have been 
called "secondary" to distinguish from the sets in section A. The first 
relates to differences in farmers' motives and behavior caused by differing 
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degrees of vulnerability, aside from differences in areL;,-yiGld variability. 
That is, farmers may be subject to essentially the same degree of yield 
variability or uncertainty and yet vary markedly in their degree of wl-
nerability to bankruptcy. Then, since one of the current major action 
programs for tlie purpose of reducing the impact of variable yields is the 
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation program, it is proposed to test the gen­
eral hypothesis that the mora vulnerable farmers tend to subscribe to crop 
insurance. 
However, crop insurance is not the only means for attaining secur­
ity, and undsr certain conditions which v/e shall explore, it is proposed 
to test the general hy^ jothesis that crop insurance and the other security 
devices are substitutable. These ivill be stated in the second of the sec­
ondary sets of hypotheses. 
1. More high-vulnerabilitj'- farmers subscribe to federal crop insur­
ance than those with lov<- vulnerability. The extensions are as 
follows! (Again, they are not all independent of each other.) 
(a) Tore farmers vrith low equity take crop insurance, 
(b) More farmers with a low ratio of equity to total farm assets 
take crop insurance. 
(c) More farmers with a higher ratio of value of real estate and ma­
chinery to total farm assets take crop insurance. 
(d) More farmers with less livestock take crop insurance, 
(e) More farmers with a lower ratio of livestock to total farm assets 
take crop insurance. 
(f) More fanners ivith a smaller total farm acreage take crop insurance. 
(g) More farmers with a greater vftieat acreage take crop insurance. 
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(h) More farmers with a smaller acreage of pasture and waste take crop 
insurance« 
(i) More farmers with a greater ratio of wheat and flax acreage (cash 
crop acreage) to total crop acreage take crop insurance. 
(j) More farmers who feel they could keep their livestock in case of 
a drouglit year, as compared with those who feel they could not, take crop 
insurance. 
(k) More farmers who feel they do not have a reliable or drought-
resistant supply of slough hay take crop insurance. 
(l) Iviore farmers who feel they could not survive a year of complete 
cash-crop failure take crop insurance. 
(m) More farmers who feel they could not obtain backing from relatives 
in time of emergency take crop insurance. 
(n) Mora farmers wiio have a large number of family members to support 
take crop insurance. 
(o) More farmers who have few family members of working age take crop 
insurance. 
(p) More farmers -wriio have a higher ratio of supportees to workers take 
crop insurance. 
(q) More farmers who have recently had large medical expenses take crop 
insurance. 
2. Farmers with crop insurance, which presumably gives them a measure 
of security, tend therefore to practice fewer additional devices. 
That is, crop insurance is substitutable for other security tech­
niques . 
It would be expected that many of the following extension hypotheses 
or subhypotheses be rejected because it is quite possible or even likely 
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that security-minded, but vulnerable, individuals would use a combination 
of security measures. Moreover, the particular combination used by an 
individual mi^ t not necessarily include crop insurance. However, as a 
method for exploring combinations or patterns of behavior and adjustment, 
the positive form for the hypotheses will be retained. They are as follows: 
Farmers with crop insurance: 
(a) will borrow more or have greater total liabilities. 
(b) Airill have more and larger farm mortgages. 
(c) v/ill have more and larger chattel mortgages. 
(d) will have done more borrovri.ng for current running e^ qjenses in re­
cent years. 
(0) will have more and larger cuz'rent liabilities. 
(f) will have a higher ratio of total liabilities to total farm as­
sets. 
(g) will have a higher ratio of current liabilities to value of live­
stock and reserves. 
(h) will have a higher ratio of total liabilities to total equity. 
(1) Tri.ll have less rented land. 
(j) v;ill have a smaller ratio of rented land to total farm assets. 
(k) will have a smaller amount of feed and grain reserves on hand. 
(1) will be fewer who believe they have sufficient feed and grain on 
hand sufficient for one whole year in advance. 
(m) v/ill have a smaller amount of liquid reserves. 
(n) will have a smaller amount of total reserves, both physical and 
liquid. 
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(o) will have a smaller ratio of total reserves to total farm assets. 
(p) will be fewer with nonfarm income. 
(q) will have more flax acreage. 
(r) vfill have less suraraerfalloTir acreage. 
(s) v/ill have a smaller ratio of fallow acreage to total cultivated 
acreag e. 
(t) will do less weed spraying, 
(u) will practice less strip cropping. 
(v) will be fewer who have ever taken hail insurance and fewer who 
have hail insurance currently. 
(w) vrill be less disposed to join a rain-making scheme. 
(x) ydll be related to their landlords in fewer numbers. 
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IV. Ef,!PIRICAL TESTING AMD MALYSIS 
Farmers in North Dakota, and in the Great Plains generally, are 
faced with extreme weather and crop yield variability. At the same time, 
average weather conditions are close enough to the critical limit for 
growth requirements that these variations take on unusual significance. 
Moreover, these variations in crop yields are for the most part unpredict­
able. Yet farmers have to meet from year to year annual expenses, debt 
payments, living costs, and the like. The ultimate objective of such a 
study as this should bo to find v^ ays of helping farmers in bringing their 
variable and uncertain incomes in better relationship with their pattern 
of ejqienditures, and avoid bankruptcy and substandard living conditions 
v/here crop failures occur through no fault of the farmer under average 
management. 
This study is indeed dedicated to the above mentioned objective 
but can only hope to make a slight advance in preparing the groundwork, 
of which there is a great need. Before lastitig solutions can be found, 
certain fiuidamental questions need answers, as a basis on which to build, 
and it is in this area that the immediate objective of the present research 
lies. Examples of tne type of questions referred to are' What are the 
factors that enter into the farmer's decision-making process in the face 
of uncertain events? What is the specific nature of the farmer's objectives 
regarding security, risk-taking, and profits? What adjustments do farmers 
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make in pursuit of this objective? In Chapter in, a number of hypotheses 
have been developed as partial ansv/ers to the above questions. If they 
are to be of any use, thoy must bo subjected to empirical testing in as 
rigorous a manner as possible. 
The present study hinges mainly on farmers' reactions to income 
variability and uncertainty Jind is limited to that significant part of in­
come variability and uncertainty which is caused by variations in crop 
yields. The experimental method would be an ideal v/ay of testing the hy­
potheses if it vrere possible to hold all variables constant except the one 
that is being studied, in this case risk, or yield variability. In eco­
nomics and other social sciences, the experimental method is generally im­
possible, but evidence can sometimes be gleaned from anpi'oxj.mations v.'here 
enough variables happen to bs similar so that fairly valid comparisons can 
be made. This is the rnothod used Cor testing the hypotheses of this study. 
A survey v;as conducted, by means of which it was considered likely that the 
risk element could be isolated, thus permitting observation of the effect 
of risk on farmers' motives and practices. 
A. Survey Design 
It was found possible to arrange a field survey as part of a larger 
study of risk and crop insurance in North Dakota. This meant that it was 
impossible to design the survey to meet the specific needs of this study 
exactly, but a reasonably good approximation was made. 
To isolate the risk factor two counties of North Dalcota vfei-e selected 
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that had virtually the same lon^ '-tiipe county aversfje lyfieat ;>deldg but dif­
fered ,-greatly in the coefficient of variation. The two ware Eddy County 
v;ith an average wheat yield (1926-iiO) of 9.B bushels per acre and a coef­
ficient of variation of li9 per cent and Burke Oounty with an average yield 
of 9.9 busaels and a coefficient of variation of 73 per cent.^  According 
to the 1930 U. 3. census of agriculture, sales from crops exceeded sales 
from livestock in botU counties, and wheat was the biggest single crop in 
both counties. 
The federal crop insurance program was the major focus of the larg­
er study (of v;hich this v/as a part), and the most efficient sample seemed 
to be one that was stratified by participation in the crop insurance pro­
gram. In one sense, for the purpose of this prestrnt study, it would have 
been better (though far more costly) not to have stratified on this basis, 
so that crop insurance participation cou3.d have appeared as a dependent 
variable. On the othar hand, it was found impossible to make a fair com­
parison of crop insurance participation any>'J'ay, because one county had 
been in the progrcim longer and previous informal studies had indicated 
that participation was related to local administration. There seemed no 
way for standardizing local administration. In addition to this, crop 
insurance was also of some importance in the present study and presumably 
the efficiency from stratification would also apply here. Finally, there 
was no need to observe crop insurance activity as a dependent variable for 
the purpose of estimating pai'ticipating numbers, because this information 
is readily available at state and county offices. As a matter of fact, 
i:). liureau of Agricultural ;:jCon'jmics. Variability of »iheat 
Yields. 1951. mimeo. p. 50. 
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the^  constitute convenient sampling lists. 
For trie i'oregoing reasons, the sample v/as stratified on the basis 
01 crop insui-ance pai'ticipation; those v,'ao had crop insurance (in 19^ 2^  
the year of the sui-ve/) and those v.'ho did not. As far as the testing and 
analysis are concerned, the crop insurance stratification made it necessary 
to invert tne first set of the secondary hypotheses, but evidence shora in 
this way should be applicable nevertheless. 
V i^thin 'the counties selected and within the strata, the sample vras 
randomly drawn from lists of the i'ederal Crop Insurance Corporation and 
the Production and j'^ arketing Adminiatration, The sampling unit and the 
observation unit were the farm operator. In Bux-ke County, 93 usable sched­
ules were obtained, consisting of I.t0 with crop insurance and 'x3 .'.athout. 
There were 3/' with crop insurance and 55 without, making a total of 9kt in 
Eddy County. 
One of the principles in the questionnaire construction was to ex­
ercise restraint in using iiypothetical questions relating to the farmer's 
motives and actions under highly imaginary circumstances. Instead, the 
emphasis was on Yviiat the farmer had done under various real situations, 
and from these attempt to draw valid conclusions. A sample of the ques­
tionnaire is appended to this study. 
B. iSvidence from Secondary Data 
The choice of Burke and Eddy counties vras made on the grounds that 
they liad similar long-run county average wheat ?/ields vdth widely divergent 
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degrees ox" vai-iability. The necessary assumption was tuat individual larms 
within the counties experienced a similar type of yield history. Without 
a detailed yield history on each parcel of laaid there ia no v;ay of checking 
this, but there is no reason, a priori or erriplrical, su-tiestiiig tixat a ran­
dom sample vrould contain any Gyatematic bias. Actually, ho-^ aver, it is 
likely taat individual farms v.'ithin each county ejqjerienced greater vari­
ability thai! the respective county averages, but here again thei-e is no 
reason to suspect that the difference in variabLlity between counties would 
be materially changed. 
There are several pieces of evidence from secondary sources, shown 
in Table 1, illustrating and explaining the rather unusual situation .vhere 
a v'similar yield average is accompanied by a very different variability co­
efficient. In short, Burke County, the high variability or high-risk county, 
tias heavier soil but less avex'age rainfall than liiddy County. Average April 
to Septembei- precipitation is 11 inches in Burke County and lit inches in 
Eddy. Percentage of years vfith less than 16 inches of precipitation is 65 
per cent for liurke and only 3? per cent for Eddy County. The lo.rer mean 
rainfall received in Burke County is offset by heavier soil, vmich happens 
to make the yield averaj^ e about t'.ie same in the I,wo coimties. The yield 
variability is greater in Burke because the precipitation variability is 
greater and because it is more subject to hail loss. In addition to this, 
Eddy County, due to its proximity and relationship I'^ ith the James River, 
has a higher water table, vjhioh helps to put a floor under ci^ op yields in 
that county, and may also act as a ceilinc; by insufficient dr.j.ina^ /;*) in 
years of excesi-ive precipitation. 
39 
Table 1, Data Relating to Level and Variability of Yields and Income 
in ^ urke and Eddy Counties, North Dakota. 
Item Burke 
County 
Eddy 
County 
Average annual precipitation^  
April-September precipitation® 
Percentage of years with less than 16" 
of precipitation^  
Annual evaporation from t anks® 
15" 
11" 
6556 
35" 
18" 
lU" 
35^  
31" 
. b 
Average hail loss rates 1927-51 
(Total losses paid/total risk vo-itten) 
BAE average wheat yield 1926-U8° 
Coefficient of variation*^  , 
BAE average wheat yield 1911-26 
U.iojg 
9.9 bu. 
11% 
11.5 bu. 
3.26^  
9.8 bu, 
1x9% 
11.U bu. 
FCIC wheat coverage/level 1952® 
FCIC wheat premium rate 1952® 
FCIC v<heat check yield 1926-it5 
5.6 bu. 
0.8 bu. 
9.7 bu. 
5.6 bu. 
0.6 bu. 
9.7 bu. 
Emergency feed and seed loans 1930-iiO 
(average per farm 1935 census) „ 
Average number of loans per farm 
Average amount loaned per farm^  
6.0 
&170 
2.2 
f?U21 
Livestock value (average per farm) 1950^  
19U5S 
ii^ l708 
$1559 
$1+063 
12781 
-umber reporting cattle and calves 1950® 10.n 68.3^  
®U. S. Weather Bureau, Climate and leather in North Dakota. 19^ 2. 
D. Hail Insurance Department. Unpublished data. 
®U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Variability of Viheat Yields. 
1951. mimeo. 
%. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Unpublished data. 
®Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, Fargo, N, D. Unpublished data. 
Farmers Home Administration, Bismarck, N. D. Unpublished data. 
®U. S. Census of Agriculture: 1950. 1, Part 11: 52-53• 1952. 
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Federal Crop Insurance Corporation actuarial rates also demon­
strate the similarity in level and difference in variability of county 
average yields. Insurance coverages are related directly to (approximately 
60 per cent of) long-run average yields. Premiums are a function of cover­
age level and variability. Vjhere coverages are the same, differences in 
premium rates are related only to variability. As shoiim in Table 1 Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation wheat coverages were $.6 bushel per acre in 19^ 2 
in both counties. Premium rates, reflecting variability, vfere 0.8 bushels 
in Burke County and 0.6 bushels in Eddy. 
The critical nature of income variability and vulnerability is in­
dicated by the number and size of emergency feed and seed loans in the two 
counties. On the average, during the 19li.0's farmers in Burke County had 
nearly three times as many loans and the average loan was nearly three times 
as large as in Eddy County. 
The lack of a suitable livestock base in Burke County as compared 
with Eddy County is also shown in Table 1. i^-ddy County had more than twice 
the value of livestock per farmer in 19^ 0 and nearly twice as much in 19U$« 
C. Survey Evidence: Hypothesis Testing 
In Chapter III four sets of hypotheses were developed. Two of 
these, which were called primary hypotheses, related to differences in mo­
tives and behavior between two groups of farmers divided on the basis of 
county average wheat yield variability. The other two, called secondary 
hypotheses, were related to differences in motives and behavior of farmers 
ia 
on the basis of stimuli other than differences in county average yield vari­
ability. The theory relating to each of those four major hypotheses was 
exrbended to a number of subhypotheses, which were subjected to empirical 
testing. While these vrere stated in a positive manner in Chapter IT.T and 
in the summary tables of the present chapter, it vfas actually the correspond­
ing negative forms or null hypotheses that were tested for statistical sig­
nificance . 
The t test was used for testing the differences between strata and 
between counties. In the case of the difference of two means 
t - yi" yg - --^2) 
S (y^ - yg) 
vihere/^2. ~/^ 2 = ® (the null hypothesis), and y2 are the sample means, 
and s (y-]_ - yg) the standard deviation of the difference of the tvro means. 
In the case of the difference of tvro frequencies, expressed as the differ­
ence of two percentages, 
t. - - Pa - tBj - ff;) 
a (Pi - Pj) 
vmere TT^  - = 0 (the null hypothesis), p2_ and P2 are the sample percent-
ages, and s (Pq_ - P2) the standard deviation of the difference of the two 
percentages. For county estimates and betvireen county comparisons, the 
strata estimates were weighted according to their respective population 
ratios because of unequal strata populations. I'or sample sizes over 10 
per cent, the variances ivere adjusted by the term 1 - n/N. 
The estimated values obtained from the survey are shown in Tables 
2 through !?, each coiroaponding to one of the four major hypotheses. The 
numbers of the individual items in the tables correspond to the subhypoth-
U2 
esis numbei's of Chapter III, llae direction of the differences, as stated 
in the altex'nate or positive foi-m, are shown by inequality symbols. 
The statistical significance of the differences are also shown in 
Tables 2-5• The eigat righthand coluniss represent a probability distribu­
tion with coluiiuis (shown here vrith equal widtiis) indicating standard devi­
ations left and right of the inaan. The percentage probabilities shown are 
the probabilities of getting as great, or (greater, differences from con­
tinued sampling if the two populations were actually one. Since the direc­
tion of differences vfas stated in the subhypotheses, entries on the left-
hand tail or side of this diagram indicate evidence against the null hy­
potheses of "no difference," or in favor of the hy][jothese3 as stated in 
the alternate or positive form. The degree of statistical significance, 
for or against the subhypotheses, is shown by the extent to which the entries 
approach columns of low probability. The symbol "X" is used to indicate 
the significance of differences between high-risk Durke County farmers and 
low-risk tiddy County farmers with respect to eacii subhypothesis. The sym­
bols "B" and "E" are used to indicate differences between those with crop 
insurance and bhose without in Burke County and in Eddy County respective­
ly, again wibh reference to each subhypothesis. 
When testing an hypothesis with a single empirical measure, it is 
customary to select some level of probability, say 1 per cent or 5 per cent 
or other depending on the type of data, and declare the evidence signifi­
cant only if it has a lower probability of occurrence. In the present study 
an attempt is made to focus evidence on four major hypotheses by testing 
four sets of subsidiary hypotheses which are theoretical extensions, conse­
Ii3 
quences, or manifestations of the foui* major ones. In this case consistency 
of direction, or the extent to which a set of results is predominantly eith­
er for or against the hypotheses, may be even more important than individu­
al levels of significance. The schematic presentation of the test results 
was used so that both consistency of direction and levels of significance 
could be sho^ m together. This provides a composite picture of the evidence 
that is necessai'y for judgment" of the major hypotheses. However, when ex­
amining any one of the individual factors in isolation, considerations of 
confidence would require the use of higher levels of significance than vrtien 
tested together in a battery. 
Some of the subhypotheses relate to the difference of two means, 
some to the difference of two frequencies, and some to the difference of 
two ratios. Some are more closely related to the major hypothesis than 
others, and hence more important. Thus the subhypotheses are not all inde­
pendent or additive in their effect. Nevertheless, each provides additional 
information and insist into the various I'amifications of the major hypoth­
eses. 
1. Primai'y hypothesis number 1 
The first major hypothesis stated that high-rislc-area farmers are 
more vulnerable than low-risk-area farmers with respect to a number of mag­
nitudes which ara independent of shoi't-run practical control of the farmer. 
These items are probably dependent on area differences iia risk in the long 
run, and for the farmer, making short-run day-to-day decisions, they are 
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Table 2. Priraaiy Hypothesis Number 1: High-risk Area Farmers Are More Vulnerable 
Vulnerability by County Average Yield Variability, and Tests of Sub 
Subhy- Mean, County average yield variability 
pothesis 
number 
Measures of vulnerability ratio, or 
frequency 
High- risk 
Burke County 
Hypothesis 
Low- risk 
Eddy County 
la • Ovmed capital- or net worth M •1532,269 < $36,1^ 06 
lb. Equity/total farm assets R .722 < .77l| 
Ic. Real estate and machinery/ 
total farm assets R .795 > .731 
Id. Value of livestock M < $9,702 
Number reporting livestock F 89.35^  < 96,1% 
le. Livestock/total farm assets R 
-
=
t 
CM H
 • < 
cr
\ CM CM 
•
 
If. Total farm acreage M 738 < 868 
Ig* ITaeat acres M 239 > 192 
Ih. Pasture and waste acres M 236 < 36U 
li. Wheat and flax/total crop 
acres R .773 > .52U 
IJ. Could keep stock througji 
year of drought F 36.1^  < k2.h% 
Ik. Reliable slough hay in 
dry years F 14i.8^  < 
11. Survive year of failure 
without borrowing F Ij9.2^  < 
G^iven the null hypothesis as true. 
v. 
The probability figures are cumulated from both tails toward 

ik Area Farmers Are More Vulnerable than Low-risk Area Farmerst Measures of Farmers' 
rield Variability, and Tests of Subhypotheses. 
>unty average yield variability Probability of obtaining observed "t" or greater 
L^ - risk „ , Low- risk 
Hypothesis 
:ke County Eddy County 
' 
For the hypothesis Against the hypothesis 
0.13^ 2.21% 15.87^ ^0% 2.21% Q.13% 0% 
3^2,269 < $36,U06 X 
.722 < .77lt X 
.79^  > .731 X 
< $9,702 X 
89.3^  < 96.1% X 
.12U < .223 X 
738 < 868 X 
239 > 192 X 
236 < 36I1. X 
.773 > .^2h X 
36,1^  < k2.k% X 
< X 
k9»2% < $1.6% X 
as true. 
:e cumulated from both tails toward the middle. 

Table 3* Primary Hypothesis Number 2s High-risk Area Farmers Practice More Sec 
Measures of Security Practices by County Average Yield Variabilil 
Subliy-
pothesis 
number 
Measures of 
security practices 
Mean, County average yield variability 
ratio, or Hi^- risk Low- risk 
frequency Burke County ^ Eddy County 0% 
2a. Total liabilities . M 2^,683 < $U,312 X 
F 53.8^  < 61.7^  
2b. Farm mortgages M f?2,7la < $U»U39 
F 29.9^  < Uo.5^  
2c. Chattel mortgages• M $1,692 < $2,30U 
F 32. < 1|2.25^  
2d. Borrow recently for expenses F 23.5^  < 36,2% 
2e. Current liabiD.ities M $1,166 < 551,579 
F < 60. 
2f. Liabilities/total farm assets R .U32 < .706 
2g. Current liabilities/livestock 
and reserves R .375 < .251i 
2h. Total liabilities/net worth R .172 < .179 
2i. Total rented real estate M- ?^ 12,327 > ?^1U,862 
F 66.856 > . 55.lfo 
2J. Rented/total farm assets R .357 > .31li 
2k. Value grain and feed reserves M ^^ 2,262 > $1,293 
F 83.0^  > 8U.8;^  
21. Feed and grain reserves 
sufficient for one year F 29.3^  > 13.9^  
2m. Liquid reserves M > v^ 2,58U 
F 90,9% > 83.0^  
2n. Total reserves M 16,355 > $3,10.7 
2o. Total reserves/total farm 
> assets R .106 .070 
2p. Nonfarm income F 19.1^  > 12,6% 
2q. Flax acres M < 75 
F 25.852 < 51.5^  X 
2r. Fallow acres M 20it > 130 X 
F •98.1|^  > 86.0,^  X 
2s. Fallow acres/total cult, acres R .395 > .230 X 
2t. Spray weeds this year or last F 68.0^  > U3.6^  X 
2u. Strip cropping F 31.8^  > 33.65s 
2v. Ever had hail insurance F 53.2^  > ii3.1^  
Had hail insurance this year F' 37.6^  > 2h,0% 
2w. Would pay as high as 10^  to 
guarantee operating costs F U8.7^  > 31,1% 
total minimum costs F 57.7^  > 35.6^  X 
2x. Y/ould subscribe to rainmaking F k l M  > 3.2^  X 
2y. Related to landlord F 29 M > 15.6^  
®Given the null hypothesis as true. 
I) The probability figures are cumulated from both tails 

sk Area Farmers Practice More Security Measures than Low-risk Area. Farmers-
y County Average Yield Variability, and Tests of Subhypotheses. 
verage yield variability 
sk 
Probability of obtaining observed "t" or greater® 
For the hypothesis'^  Hypothesis Low- risk 
Eddy County 
Against the hypothesis'^  
Oj^  0.13^  2.27^  1^ .87^  0.13^  0^  
< :|!iU,312 X 
< 61.7^  
< %k,k39 X 
< X 
! < 1J2,30U ' X 
t < h:i*2% X 
• < 36.2^  X 
1 < &,579 X 
1 < 6o,k% 
< .706 X 
< .251; 
< .179 p > &it,862 t 
) > 55.lfo X 
> »31h 1 > $1,293 X f ) > 
f 1 > 13*9% X 
} > $2,58U X 5 > 83.0^  X 
> > $3,l4l7 X 
> 
.070 X 
i > 12.6^  X 
< 7$ X 
i. < 51.5^  X 
i 
> 130 X 
> 86.0^  X 
i 
> .230 X 
> h3.6% X 
t > 33.6% 
% > h3.1% X 
t > 2h*0% X 
t > 31.1% X 
t > 3^.6% X 
t > 3.2% X 
% > 1^.6% X 
X 
tiesis as true. 
res are cumulated from both tails toward the middle. 
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Table U. Secondary Hypothesis Number Is More High-vulnerability Fanners Talte Federa 
Measures of Farmers' Vulnerability by Crop Insurance Participation, an 
Subhy- Measures of Crop insurance participation 
pothesis ratio, or Burke County Eddy County 
number vulnerability frequency. 
Haves Hypoth. Have 
hots Haves Hypoth 
Have 
nots 
la. Ovmed capital or net 
< worth M $30,550 632,553 .1!!28,527 < |ijl,807 
lb. Equity/total farm assets R ,66k < .752 .71h < .796 
Ic. Real estate and machinery > > /total farm assets R .825 .791 .753 .725 
Id. Value of livestock M < $U,2U8 1^ 7,625 < m765 
Number reporting livestock F 85.o$g < 90.6^  97.h% < 96,h% 
le. Livestock/total farm 
< assets R .12U .127 .212 < ,23h 
If. Total farm acreage M 826 < 727 77U < 927 
Ig. Wheat acres M 268 > 225 195 > 191 
Ih. Pasture and waste acres M 268 < 232 297 < 1^ 01 
li. "Wheat and flax/total 
> crop acres R .78U .771 .566 > 
r
^
 C
O 
•
 
13. Could keep stock throu^ 
< year of drou^ t R .29h .372 .la2 < .li29 
Ik. Reliable slough hay in 
< < dry years F 38.5^  5U.2^  hl,2% kh,2% 
11. Survive year of failure 
without borrowing F ii2.5^  < 5U.2^  hh*7% < 55.6^  
Im. Emergency backing from 
< relatives F 25.056 23.1^  20,% < 22.2^  
In. Nmnber to support M U.l > 3.8 il.2 > U.l 
lo. Number to work M 2.0 < 1.9 2.0 < 2.1 
Ip. Number to support/number 
to work R 2.09 > 2.08 2.18 > 2.11 
Iq. Large'medical expenses 
> > recently F 15.8^  22.6ss; 3U.25S 25.9^  
®Given the null hypothesis as true. 
^The probability figures are cumulated from both tails 

gh-vulnerability Farmers Take Federal Crop Insurance than Those with Low Vulnerability: 
• by Crop Insurance Participation, and Tests of Subhypotheses. 
op insurance participation Probability of obtaining observed "t" or greater 
County Eddy County For the hypothesis^ Against the hypothesis 
th. 
nets Haves Hypoth. ^^7® nots 0% 0.13^ 2.27^ ^0% 15.87^ 2.2755 0.13^ 
632,553 
.752 
$28,527 
.7lU A
 A
 
•fill, 807 
.796 
E 
EB 
B 
.791 
$li>2U8 
90.6% 
.753 
$7,625 
97*h% 
> 
< 
< 
.725 
$10,765 
96,k% 
EE 
E 
B E 
B 
.127 
727 
225 
' 232 
.212 
77U 
195 
297 
< 
< 
> 
< 
,23h 
927 
191 
UOl E 
E 
B 
EB 
E 
B 
B 
.771 .566 > ,hQl E B 
: .372 .ia2 < ,k29 BE 
: 5U.2^  kl.2% < kh.2% B E 
: 5u.2^  hh,7% < 55.6^  BE 
' 23.1^  
3.8 
: 1.9 
20,% 
h*2 
2.0 < 
22.2^  
H.l 
2.1 
E 
BE 
E 
B 
B 
> 2.08 2.18 > 2.11 EB 
> 22.6^  3U.2^  > 25.9^  E B 
/potheais as true, 
figures are cumulated from both tails toward the middle. 
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Table Secondary Hypothesis Number 2s Farmers with Crop Insurance Tend to Practic 
Measures of Additional Security Practices by Crop Insurance Participat 
Crop insurance tarticipation 
potheSs . Measures of rati^'or Burke County Eddy County 
number security practices frequency Haves Hypoth. Haves Hypoth. 
nots ^ nots 
2a. Total liabUities M f^ 2,752 > ?^2,66li ^^ u,021 > ,^5ia 
F 6^,0% > 50.9^  71.7:6 > 5ii..55? 
2b. Farm mortgages M $2,971 > J^2,68l ^ |;li,786 > 0U,2OC 
F ko*o% > 29.2^  k3M > 38.8? 
2c. Chattel mortgages M $2, Ola > |i2,oh7 > ;!?2,U82 
F > 32,0% kQ»n > •38.251 
2d. Borrow recently for expenses F 30.0% > 22 M > 32.751 
2e. Current liabilities M $1,265 > Si,165 $1,226 > ei,83S 
F 65.0^  > ^0.0% 71.1^  > 53.7? 
2f. Liabilities/total farm assets R .086 > .oiil .091 > .0U8 
2g. Current liabilities/ 
livestock and reserves R .3^ 7 > .38U .21li > .286 
2h. Total liabilities/net worth R .2^ 3 > .168 .208 > .162 
2i. Total rented real estate M $^1^ ,185 < ^^ 2,238 ,^ 15,591 < $1U,38J 
F 70,0% < 66,0% 56.1;;6 < 5U.55 
2j. Rented/total farm assets R .U07 < .331 .360 < .293 
2k. Value grain andfeed reserves M §2,302 < $2,251 ^ l,lli2 < $1,285 F 72.5^  < 8U.9,f. 79.5;6 < 87.35 
21. Feed and grain reserves 
sufficient for one year F 17.5^  < 30.2^  12.8$ < lU.55 
2m. Liquid reserves li $2,9U6 < $5,180 $l,2li8 < $3,59] 
F 92.5^  < 90.6^  Qk.6% < 81.85 
2n. Total reserves M $U,625 < $6,730 ^ 2^,070 < 
F 9^.0% < 98.1^  9k,9% < 98.2; 
2o. Total reserves/total 
farm assets R .088 < .109 .062 < .071; 
2p. Nonfarm income F 20,0^  < 18.9^  15.W < 10.9: 
2q. Flax acres M 32 > li7 6U > 80 
F 22.^% > 26. k6,2% > 5U.5! 
2r. Fallow acres M 212 < 198 119 < 136 
F 100.056 < 98.156 87.256 < 85.5: 
2s. Fallow acres/total cult, acres R .379 < .398 .23li < .228 
2t. Spray weeds this year or last F 6Q,k% < 61,9% U3.656 < Wi.H: 
2u. Strip cropping F 37.5JS < 30,2% 38.5$ < 30.9 
2v. Ever had halL insurance F 7^.0% 
28.2^  
< ^0,9% hQ.1% < Ivo.o 
Had hail insurance in 19^ 2 F < 38.5^ . n,6% < 27.8 
2w, Vfould subscribe to rainmaking F 52.5^  < hl>1% 9.n < 0.0 
2x. Related to landlord F UO.7^  < 25.7^  13 M < 16.7 
Given the null hypothesis as true. 
^The probability figures are cumulated from bot 

ith Crop Insurance Tend to Practice Fewer Additional Security Devicesj 
tices by Crop Insurance Participation, and Tests of SuWiypotheses. 
Crop dnsurance tarticipation Probability of obtaining observed "t" or greater^ 
County Eddy County For the hypothesis Against the hypothesis^ 
toth. Have 
nots Haves Hypoth. 
Have _ 
nots 0^ 0.13^ 2*21% 1^.8?^ ^0% 2*27% 0.13% 0% 
> ^?2,661| $U,021 > Sl+,5ijl B E 
> 50.9^ 71.75^ > EB 
> ^j2,68l $U,786 > ^?U,200 EB 
> 29.2^ h3*8% > 3Q*8% BE 
> S,1,6^6 $2,Oli7 > i|?2,ii82 B E 
> 32.0;^ hB*l% > •38.2Jg EB 
> 22.6^ iil.O^ > 32.7^ EB 
> ^^1,16^ .<^1,226 > $1,839 B 
> 50.0/. 71.15S > ^3.1% EB 
> .01(1 .091 > .OkB B E 
> .38U *21k > .286 BE 
> .168 .208 > .162 B E 
< 4^2,238 $15,^91 < ^^1U,382 E 
< 66,0% ^6.k% < EB 
< .331 .360 < .293 
< $2,251 U,lh2 < $1,289 E B 
< Qh*9% 19*^% < Ql.3% BE 
< 30*2% 12.Q% < lk*5% B E 
< $5,180 !!il,2lt8 < $3,591 E B 
< 90.6:2 814.6^ < 81.8$ BE 
< $6,730 ^^2,070 < ^U,1U0 E B 
< 9Q*l% 9k*9% < 98.2^ EB 
< .109 .062 < .OlU BE 
< 18.9^ 15.W < 10*9% BE 
> hi 6h > 80 EB 
> 26*h% k6.2% > 5U.5^ BE 
< 198 119 < 136 E B 
< 98.i;g 87.2^ < 85.5^ EB 
< .398 .23li < .228 B E 
< 61*9% h3»6% < E B 
< 30,2% 38.5^ < 30.95^ BE 
< $0*9% U8.7^ < Uo.o$ E 
< 38.5^ 17.6:2 < 21.8% EB 
< U7.15^ 9*1% < 0*0% B 
< 25.7^ 13*6% < 16*1% E 
B 
EB 
E 
B 
11 hypothesis as true. 
ity figures are cumulated from both tails toward the middle 
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largely beyond the realm of his economic choice. The evidence as shovm in 
Table 2 would seem to be consistent with the general hypothesis. While 
several of the items are of dubious statistical significance individually, 
every one is in the direction postulated. 
The survey results indicate that the high-risk-area farmer has a 
financial structure and a farm organization that is unsafe relative to 
farmers in the low-risk area. In the high-risk county of Burke equities 
are lower, both absolutely and as a proportion of total capital. There is 
less livestock but more investment in real estate and machinery. There is 
greater dependence on cash crops as a -v-vhole and \vheat in particular, prob­
ably because of less suitable pasture and reliable feed supplies. More 
farmers expressed the view that they would not be able to feed livestock 
through a drought year in Burke County than in ^ ddy. 
2. Primary hypothesis number 2 
The second major hypothesis states that high-risk-area farmers 
practice more security measures than low-risk-area farmers. The assumption 
is that these farmers, being more vulnerable, will place a greater value 
on the objective of security as compared with the objective of immediate 
profits than will the less vulnerable low-risk-area farmers. Moreover, 
many of these safety devices are obtained only at a sacrifice of efficiency 
( 
and profits in the static sense. In general the survey evidence, as shown 
in Table 3> supports this hypothesis. Again the preponderance of the items 
is consistent in direction as stated in the hypothesis. 
U9 
The high-risk-area farmers attempt to protect themselves by exer­
cising more restraint in the use of borrov/ed capital and by renting a 
greater proportion of their assets instead. They maintain more idle re­
serves, both physical and monetary, as a protection against adversity, 
both absolutely and as a proportion of total farm assets. 'iVhile they have 
very little choice between cash crops and livestock, they do try to grow 
less flax which is a very riskycrop, and to have more of their land in fal­
low. They are more insurance-minded and look with more favor on hail insur­
ance, rain-making schemes, and other insurance devices. 
3. Secondary hypothesis number 1 
The third major hypothesis states that more high-vulnerability 
farmers subscribe to the federal crop insurance than those with low vul­
nerability. As mentioned in section A of this chapter, it was not possible 
in this survey to treat crop insurance participation as a dependent vari­
able, so this hypothesis and all its extensions were inverted for testing 
purposes. Thus, it would say in effect, "Farmers with crop insurance are 
basically more vulnerable, with respect to the vulnerability factors of 
the first hypothesis, than those without crop insurance." This hypothesis 
assumes that .'/ith risk held constant the farmers that have crop insurance 
took it because they were more vulnerable. Comparisons are made between 
the "Haves" and the "Have Nets" within each county and are shoiira in Table 
1;. The test results are shown by the symbols "B" for Burke County and "E" 
for Eddy County, 
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A considerable majority of the items are consistent in direction 
with the stated subhypotheses, but the levels of significance are not as 
strong as with the two primary hypotheses. Presumably this would indicate 
that differences in vulnerability are not aa important between those v/ho 
have crop insui^ ance and those who do not within each area, as they are be­
tween areas of different yield variation coefficients. It could also indi­
cate that the vulnerability factors used explain crop insurance participa­
tion only moderately well within any given degree of yield variation, 
Yfliile differences betvreen farmers with crop insurance and those 
without, with respect to vulnerability characteristics, are not as pronounced 
as in the case of between-county comparisons, the same overall pattern is 
evident. The farmers who subscribe to crop insurance are generally the ones 
who have lovir equity, a larger proportion of their farm suited for cash crops, 
and less able to carry their livestock through a year of drought. They are 
the ones who consider themselves most likely to need credit in order to sur­
vive a year of crop failure. 
It vms e:xpected that family considerations would be a vulnerability 
factor affecting crop insurance participation. Hovrever, as shovm in items 
m through p in Table U, no sti'ong relationships were observed. Numbers in 
the family requiring support or numbers able to contribute to the working 
force were not significant factors. No consistent relationship was obseirved 
betvreen crop insurance participation and the burden of large medical bills. 
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k» Secondary hyijothesis number 2 
The final major hypothesis states that farmers vfith crop insur­
ance, v<hich presumably gives them some degree of security, tend to prac­
tice fewer of the other security devices. The assumption is that crop 
insurance and other security devices are substitutable. However, it was 
mentioned in Chapter III that >vhile this is a convenient statement for 
testing, it would be expected that many farmers would have a combination 
of security practices of which crop insurance might or might not be one. 
This would mean that the evidence should in some way be divided, some in 
favor of the hypothesis and some against. 
As shown in Table 5 the survey data bear this out. Hie items are 
divided on the significance scale almost half and half, for and against. 
However, cai'e should be exercised in drawing conclusions as to particular 
patterns of security practices on the basis of tliis fact alone since the 
individual magnitudes tested are not all independent. Some unexplained 
inconsistencies are also observed where the evidence in one county supports 
the hypothesis vriiile in the other county it is against it. 
To the extent that the individual items are significant, entities 
on the lefthand side or tail of the scale indicate items that are substitut­
able v/ith crop insurance v^ ile entries on the right tail indicate items 
that are combined with crop insurance. From the evidence, there would seem 
to be an indication that crop insurance and lack of debts are substitutable. 
Or perhaps more re;alistically, that when a farmer borrovra capital he attempts 
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to recover some security by taking crop insurance. This also seems to be 
the case ;vith reserves ivhcro the "Haves" in both counties have leas reserves 
—^ both physical and monetary—than the "Have Nots." 
With respect to various farm cultiu-al practices and land use the 
evidence, v^ iile it is not highly sigriificantj suggests tihat these practices 
are complementary to, or combined with, crop insurance instead of substitut-
ing for it. There is some sligjit evidsnce that farmers with crop insurance 
also are the ones viho tend to avoid flax, practice strip cropping, and look 
with favor on other types of income insurance. 
The case of hail insurance, item 2v, is interesting. Tlie evidence 
is contrary to the first part of this hypothesis that fewer "^ Wes" have 
ever had hail insurance than "Have Nots," but it is consistent with the 
second part of the hypothesis that fewer "Haves" had hail insiarance in the 
current year. This suggests that hall insurance is complementary to all-
risk crop insurance over time, that it was used as the result of similar 
motives v^ -iien there vras no crop insurance available j but that it is competi­
tive in the present since fevrer crop-insurance participants had hail insur­
ance than nonparticipants. 
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V. INTJaiPRETATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Motives and Dehavioi' under High-risk Conditions 
It is the method of this study to drav;- conclusions rej^ arding farm­
ers' motives and objectives by observing their behavior and adjustments in 
the face of various stimuli. The principal circumstance or stimulus was 
v/heat j-leld variability. An attempt vtas made to isolate this factor by 
choosing tyra counties as nearly alike as possible in most relevant charac­
teristics except for a substantial difference in yield variability over 
time. Mditional auxiliary factors also contributing to farmers' vulnera­
bility v'fere set forth in primary hypothesis number 1 as basic circumstances 
insofar as they are generally outside the limits of the average farm'ir's 
choice or control. iVithout exception these factors ivere found to pose a 
greater threat to farmers' security in higli-risk Burke '^ ounty than in low-
risk Eddy County. That is, fai-mers in Burke County had smaller equities, • 
both absolutely and as a proportion of their total assets. They vrere 
obliged by practical circumstances to have a larger proportion of their 
total assets in the form of real estate and machinery, and a smaller pro­
portion in livestock. Natural conditions greatly favored a cash crop econ­
omy in burke County vrith very little scope for diversification. These vul­
nerability factors, together with the high yield variability, are the 
stimuliJ vulnerability stimuli that are strong in Burke County, relatively 
weak in Eddy County. 
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The adjustments or betiavior expected to result from these stimuli, 
on the assumption that farmers desire security, were stated under primary 
hypothesis number 2. These adjustments or behavior responses were various 
security-achieving techniques which tlie high-risk area farmer should prac­
tice more diligently if he in fact does place a premium on security. Ac­
cording to the data nearly all the behavior responses occurred in the man­
ner predicted. For example. Burke County farmers, as compared -ivith Eddy 
County farmers, refrained from using as much borrov/ed capital, had more re­
serves both liquid and physical, maintained more flexible arrangements in 
their farm organization, practiced certain security-giving cultural tech­
niques ii]o:re extensively, such as s'jmmerfallow, and were more inclined to 
favor various income-hazard insurance schemes. 
Having isolated the stimuli, and having observed the behavi.or re­
sponses, the conclusions regarding motives follow. The farmers in this 
study have shown that the desire for security, or protection from insolvency, 
is an important motivating force. In one sense this goal of security is 
merely a means to an end—the end of maximum income—and under conditions 
of absolute certainty would be completely submerged by this superior end. 
But uncertaintj'- and risk is the rule, not the exception, and under these 
conditions of risk it may even become dominant and fanners may behave as 
if it were the superior end for a3.1 practical purposes. Thus the fanner 
in the high-risk situation can be expected to try to protect hijtiself even 
at considerable cost or inefficiency so long as various vulnerability fea­
tures threaten his security. However, there are limits to the extent to 
which farmers \vill sacrifice chances of maximum income prospects in favor 
of increasing tne likelihood of I'emaining solvent. These limits vary be­
tween farmers and depend upon personal preferences regarding security and 
risk, natural environmental conditions, anticipations of future hazards 
and incomes, and the relative costs and benefits involved in alternative 
risk-bearing techniques. 
Under the secondary hypotheses an attempt was made to relate the 
auxiliary vulnerability factors to behavior responses and adjustments Rdth 
i'ield variability neld constant, Within each county vulnerability com-
p.»risons were made Detwaen larniiirs that currently have federal crop insur­
ance and those that do nob. The relationships exhibi.ted j.n this case were 
much weaker than foimevly, pi'asamably because the element of yield varia-
bili.ty vras neuti-aliaed. Nevertheless most of the measures v.'ere consistent 
vfith the iiypotihetiis. Hence the j^ stieral conclusion is dravm bhat, given the 
same county average conditions of ^ ield variability, farmers who are in a 
more vulnerable position v/ill more likely subscribe to crop insuranc;?..' Vaan 
I,Hose v;ho are less vii].nerable. Individual characteristics of vulnerability 
related to crop inouranna participation are the amount of ov/ned capital or 
equity lih(3 farmer possesses, the proportion of total assets that must be 
invested in the relatively fixed ones of real estate and machinery, the 
degree to 'which the area is unsuited for livestock pi-oduction, the degree 
to which the type of fai'minij is confined to production of cash crops, and 
the uefH-'eo to v^ ich they feel they could not survive a year of crop failure 
without credit. It was not shovm that crop insurance participation was re­
lated in any important way to size of family, medical bills, or vmether or 
not they thought they could obtain support from relatives in t:Lme of emer­
gency. 
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Along with, or instead ol", crop insurance are a number of other 
practices that farmers i-inploy to achieve protection from the adverse ef­
fects of low yields, Sevei-al relationships emerged from the study but 
ip.arjty of the.n A-ere rather .veak. From the evidence it is concluded that 
crop insurance participation is related positively to the amount of lia­
bilities tnat a fanner has, both absolutely and as a proportion of total 
fanii assets. Liquid reserves and reserves of feed and grain are related 
nof'atively to crop insm-ance. 1/ost of the items related in a complementary 
way to crop insm-ance, that is ax'e eirojloyed along vfith crop insurance, are 
gc:neraily recommended as good farming practices v/hich will increase income 
as well as securitj'. .Among these vj(u-e renting more land, more nonfarm in­
come, and more svuiimerfallow and strip cropping. 
B. Application of Findings 
The major puiposo of ttiis ntudy aas bean to improve the foundation 
for reseai'ch in agricultiu-al economics by attempting to clarify fanners' 
motives anvi behavior so that solutions and reconanendations v^ ill have great­
er applicabili.ty in real-life situations. Vihile the emphasis here ic on 
the i-csenrch stage, some conclusions can be dravm from t he study trfiich do 
have application at a more practical level. Some inadequacies in present 
practices and programs can be noted and some suggestions can be made with 
respoct to farmers and to inati.tutions. 
Perhaps the most apparent deficiency in high-risk area farming is 
the lack of sufficient capital. Insofar as economies of scale exist, or 
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in the range in -which they do exist, security, or tolerance to low yields, 
can be improved by operating on a larger scale. Secondly, average annual 
incomes may be larger and hence the opportunity is improved for further ex­
pansion or building reserves. And finally, if one of the less frequent 
losses, less frequent because of greater efficiency, does occur, it is 
easier and quicker to recoup in succeeding years. But how is this stage 
to be reached? With farms of small size and limited equity the farmer 
finds himself in a rather vicious circle. Because of small scale he breaks 
even at a relatively high yield level, perhaps not too far below the long-
run average yield. He makes smaller profits and the years in which profits 
occur are fewer. In the same way he sustains more frequent losses and can 
only recoup with greater difficulty. Thus the undercapitalized fanner has 
greater need for security yet is less able to reach it. If he is fortunate 
enough to accumulate some profits he can either expand his business or keep 
a reserve of cash balances. If he tries to expand by buying more land so 
that he can gain both income and security he may spread his equity so thin 
that he is in grave danger of becoming bankrupt in the short run. If in­
stead he chooses to increase his cash reserves and to refrain from borrow­
ing, he achieves a small degree of short-run security at the sacrifice of 
the chance of both long-run income and security. 
This troublesome choice that faces the farmer must be considered 
in the setting of the customary capital market where loans are granted on 
the basis of a conservative proportion of the collateral offered and with 
rather rigid repayment schedules. This compares with the lovir equity posi­
tion and extremely variable income of high-risk area farmers. Lenders be­
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come reluctant to lend and farmers reluctant to borrow. The result is, 
as we have seen, that many farmers have no choice but to try to protect 
what little they have by avoiding debt and trying to gain what safety they 
can from idle reserves. Imagination and perseverance are urgently needed 
to develop a type of credit more adequately suited to the variable income 
areas of agriculture. 
A second deficiency suggested by this study is the limited benefit 
to high-risk-ai'ea farmers from diversification by keeping livestock in 
addition to cash grain production. Viihere the limiting factor is precipita­
tion and accompanying low yields, the keeping of livestock seems to be re­
lated more to the basic conditions of pasture and feed supplies than to the 
need for security. A livestock enterprise may earn a return greater than 
a cash reserve in the bank so long as feed is plentiful, but it can easily 
turn into a liability to the high-risk-area farmer at the same time that 
cash crops fail. 
Unless a farmer is prepared to market his herd when feed supplies 
are short at a time v/lien other farmers may be liquidating their herds al­
so, he should gauge the size of his livestock enterprise by the feed nor­
mally available from the nontillable land at his disposal. In addition to 
this, carrying at least a year's supply of feed, probably on a revolving 
basis, would appear to be sound practice in areas where yields are so vari­
able. 
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation sells all-risk crop insur­
ance for the purpose of enabling farmers to protect themselves against 
the hazards of low yields. The aim of the program is not to insure against 
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loss of profits but against loss of actual investment in the crop. In 
this way it is similar to a deductible type of insui-ance. North Dakota 
ranlcs very high in participation, but there is no evidence to shov/ that 
county participation is related to county average yield variability. Our 
study has shovm that the farmers, in each courjty, who have crop insurance 
also exhibit the greatest degree of vulnerability but the relationships 
are not strong. K^ iy do not more farmers, and especially those in the high-
risk areas, subscribe to crop insurance? The reasons are several. Pre-
miums are high relative to levels of coverage because premium rates are a 
function both of coverage level and of variability. Thus mere yield vari­
ability is highest and protection is most needed, premiums are also high­
est. The deductible feature is misunderstood and resented, and they feel 
they do not collect enough from the prograj-n. Farmers are especially bitter 
when, after getting a crop at or just above the coverage level, they are 
faced v/ith a bill for the premium. There is criticism because the program 
does not distinguish betv;een crops on summerfallow and continuous cropping. 
There is also criticism because the rates are based on the ejcperience of 
approximately the last twenty years. This they say weights the poor years 
too heavily because modern povver, equipment, varieties, and cultural prac­
tices are gradually raising minimum yields. The Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation is continually experimenting and revising the program. These 
are some of the problems or objections that need to be met before the plan 
is successful in protecting the majority of fanners from the effects of 
low yields. 
Lastly, another deficiency may be in the field of farmer education. 
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V<e refer both to the need for farmers to gain a better understanding of 
the nature of their predicament, and the need for information more applic­
able to their problems. Without ma.jor changes of an institutional nature 
farmers in high-risk areas must bear in mind that yields will continue to 
fluctuate, that their incomes vfill vary from year to year, and that a large 
part of their expenses cannot be postponed. This suggests that farmers 
need to view their production period as longer than one year, say five 
years, so that the uneven flovif of income over the period may be spread more 
evenly over the years. Tney need better infoimation pertaining to the ad­
vantages and disadvantages of diversification. In 3:eneral they need guide-
post infomiation of the ty[je that v/ill show the relative costs and benefits 
from various practices not only with respect to the income prospects but 
also indicating the security prospects. Only the individual knows the 
relative values he places on income and security, but with this type of 
information he could make more rational decisions and hence come closer 
to maximizing his {pals vmatever they are. 
C. Research Orientation 
The implications of the results of this study should have a direct 
bearing on research relating to high-risk agriculture. Having raised the 
security objective to a position of importance in the scheme of farmers' 
objectives, research programs can be examined in a new light. Two types 
of economic research are suggested. One is improved decision-making tech­
niques that will take account of the dualism of objectives and their inter­
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actions. The second is to improve the environmsntal impacts vihich con­
stitute the frainevrork in which the farmer m:i!<es his decisions and choices. 
The first arises from the proposition that farmers assipin relative 
vreights to their tirro objectives according to personal preferences and a 
variety of conditions including equity, responsibilities, uncertainties, 
type of farming, and credit rationing, that are beyond the realm of prac­
tical choice. To make rational choices and decisions that are most likely 
to result in a maximization of his objectives as weighted in his ovm mind, 
the farmer needs guideposts shov.dng what may be expected as a result of 
various courses of action. For any course of action, he wants to know how 
much security he can gain, hovr much profit he v/ill make, and the costs and 
probabilities involved. Then he can make more rational decisions as to 
how much risk he is willing to run for the sake of high incoine or hovr much 
income he is ivilling to sacrifice for security. The need for this type of 
information vras raised in the previous section, but it is the researcher 
who will iiave to provide it. 
Farmers in high-risk areas have received plenty of conflicting ad­
vice in the past about the merits of specialii^ ation on the one hand and of 
diversification Vvlth livestock on the other. These have usually emphasized 
long-run average profits 7n.thout refi;ard for security or continuity, or the 
mistaken notion that any kind of diversity will guarantee security. Actual­
ly, there are limits vathin v/hich diversification vdll achieve either prof­
its or security. Economic research is largently needed to examine the merits 
of diversification in the light of the objective of security as well as in­
come. 
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Some possibilities for useful research may also lie in developing 
ways and means for making farm expenses more flexible and postponable so 
that disbursements can ue matched more directly with variable incomes. It 
is likely that no easy solutions exist, but an obvious n>?ed in this regard 
is in the field of debt servicin[^ , so that farmers v/ith highly variable in­
comes can use more credit. 
Via have seen that high-risk-area farmers tend to keep idle reserves 
of cash and other savings. Investigation here might be able to develop 
more profitable uses for tuese balances iind sbill retain the essential se­
curity features. 
The second avenue of research tiiat is sugrveated is to investigate 
possible improvements in the conditions that form the framework of the 
farmer's choices but lie largely outside it. For example, one of these 
is the problem of capital rationing. Too often we accept this as given. 
Vie say fcaat risk results in rationing by the lender and also that risk (or 
risk aversion) I'esults in abstinence by the potential borrovrer. The dis­
tinction here is not particulai'ly useful. Actually, both these types of 
capital insufficiency ax-e caused by a set of institutional customs mich 
have not become adapted to the needs of high-risk agriculture. As men­
tioned before, custom demands collateral security and a rigid repayment 
schedule, which are not at all suitable to a fluctuating income. (Credit 
has adapted itself admirably to some other types of enterprise) some imagi­
native research coupled vv'ith an educational program mi^ t succeed in mak­
ing the capital market more useful to high-risk agriculture. Attention 
might bo given to alternative types of collateral or substitutes for it. 
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to government-insured loans, to longer and more flexible repayment .sched­
ules, or to some form of equity financing. Any improvements here would 
assist farmers in emerging from the capital dilemma described in the previ­
ous section. 
Part of the farraer's environment consists of the various risk-
spreadinp; devices that are available to him. Prominent amon^ r these is the 
all-risk crop insurance program with respect to v/hich several defects have 
ali'eady been mentioned. Research is required in this area to determine -he 
feasibility of settinr; different rates according to cultural practices such 
as suminerfallow, to study rates baaed on currently accepted farm practice 
compared aith historical •;)delds. If premium rates cannot be made more at­
tractive in any othor way investigation should be made of the possibilities 
and desirability of subsidizing tiie scheme. The marginal returns, in terras 
of increased farmer efficiency through increased security, from such a sub­
sidy may or Ttay not iDa quite hi^ h. They may or may not be greater than 
money spent on altei-native ad hoc disaster programs. Precedent exists for 
the use of the equalization principle. If research shows the benefits to 
be great enough its use should be investigated v;-ith respect to crop insur­
ance or some alternative. 
finally, research method should be noted. In economics the inclu­
sion of decision-making, thought processes, and motivations is relatively 
new. Because a researcher is trained in economic analysis does not mean 
he is trained in the technique of probing the depths of farmers' minds. 
The individual cannot trace the workings of his ovm subcoascious, let alone 
describe it to an inten^ ievrer. If economic researchers are going to embark 
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on such atudies thay need to bo thoroughly ti'ained in these psychological 
disciplines, or at leaat enlist the aid of such persons in deve:lopin(j re-
seai-ch techniques. 
This study has been based on the assumption that useful work can 
be done on a level that avoids those very dangerous pitfalls. An attempt 
has been made to dra'.v conclusions based mainly on the observation of real 
reactions to real kbirauli. Relationships were hypothesised, the stimuli 
ivore identified, tne responses '.vere observed, and finally conclusions were 
dravvni To the extent that merit exists herein it sho'Lld be a useful addi­
tion to our body of research mathods. 
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VI. SUffiMY 
The focus of this study was on the variability and uncertainty of 
farm income in North Dakota. The specific problem investigated was limited 
to that significant part of income variability which is caused by annual 
variations in crop yields and to that part of the impact of this variability 
vriiich constitutes the danger of banlcruptcy. On the grounds that insuffi­
cient recognition has been given to the part played in farmers' value sys­
tems by the goal of security and their preference for certainty, part of 
the problem was to explore farmers' motivations in the actions they take 
to adjust to the risk of insolvency. 
Four sets of hypotheses v/ere developed to explore the relationships 
between yield variability, other vulnerability factors, crop insurance par­
ticipation, and other security practices. Each set consisted of a major 
hypothesis and a number of subsidiary hypotheses that vrere theoretical ex­
tensions of the major one. Vulnerability factors were farm characteris­
tics, in addition to yield variability, that are lai'gely outside the lim­
its of the average farmer's control, but which tend to threaten his secxirity 
or solvency. Security practices were various practices which fafmers em­
ploy to gain security. 
The method was to dravr conclusions regarding farmers' motives and 
objectives by observing their behavior responses to various stimuli. To 
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isolate the risk factor two counties in North Dakota, Burke and Eddy, 
vvere selected that had virtually the same long-time county average v/heat 
yields (9.9 and 9.8 bushels per acre respectively) but widely divergent 
coefficients of variation of those vjheat yields (73 per cent and li? per 
cent respectively). This unusual condition was presumably due to varia­
tion around a lower mean rainfall but a heavier type of soil in Burke County 
than in Mdy County, Further, Eddy County had a higher water table, in ef­
fect tending to put both a floor and a ceiling on yields in that county. 
The sample was stratified on the basis of federal crop insurance partici­
pation in the year of the survey—those wno had crop insurance and those 
vrho had not. In the scaeduJ.e an attempt was made to avoid hifpothetical 
questions, but rather to relate actual behavior to real stimuli. 
In testing hypotheses and judging significance of comparative dif­
ferences, weight was given both to probability levels of the tests of the 
individual subhypotheses according to the standard "t" tost as applied to 
the differences, and to consistency of direction that was displayed by a 
set of subhypotheses as a group. That in, the direction of t!ie differences 
>7as stated in each subhypothesis. Hence it was assimed that the greater 
the proportion of the subhyrjotheses that showed evidence consistently in 
the directions stated the j^ reater the confidence in the major hypothesis. 
The first two major hypotheses ?irare comparative statements relating 
to differences in motives and behavior between the two counties divided on 
the basis of yield variability. The first major hj.-pothesis stated tluat 
high-risk-area farmers, on the average, are more vulnerable than low-risk-
area farmers with respect to D.2 vulnerability measures which constituted 
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the subhypotheses. IVithout exception these 12 factors were found to pose 
a greater threat to farmers' security in high-risk Burke County than in 
low-risk liddy County. In summary, the farmers in Burke County had smaller 
equities, both absolutely and as a proportion of their total assets. They 
were obliged by practical circumstances to have a larger proportion of 
their total assets in the form of real estate and machinery, and a smaller 
proportion in livestock. Natural conditions favored a relatively straight 
cash-crop economy in Burke County vfith very little scope for diversifica­
tion. 
Having identified the conditions and stimuli, the second major hy­
pothesis stated that high-risk-area farmers practice more security measures 
than low-risk-area farmers, ivith respect to '2$ items wiiich constituted the 
subhypotheses. These security practices were various security-achieving 
techniques which the more vulnerable farmer should practice more intensive­
ly if he places a premium on security. According to the data the behavior 
responses occurred in the manner predicted with fevir exceptions. In sum­
mary, Burke County fanners, as compared with iiddy County farmers, refrained 
from using as much borrowed capital, kept more reserves both liquid and 
physical, maintained more flexibility in their farm organization, practiced 
certain yield-stabilizing cultural techniques more extensively such as sum-
merfallow, and werti more inclined to favor various income-guaranteeing in-
sui'ance schemes. 
The third and fourth major hypotheses were comparative statements 
related to differences in motives and behavior on the basis of stimuli other 
than county average yield variability. The third major hypolhosis stated 
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that more high-vulnerability fairoers subscribe to federal crop insurance 
than those vfith low vulnerability, using the same vulnerability factors as 
before. The relationships in this case vxere weaker than formerly, because 
yield variability vfas held equal, but most of the measures were consistent 
with the major hypothesis. Hence the conclusion was that, given the same 
county average conditions of yield variability, farmers vriio are in a more 
vulnerable position will tend to take crop insurance in greater numbers 
than those wiao are less vulnerable. 
The fourth major hypothesis stated that farmers with crop insur­
ance, which presumably gives them a measure of security, tend to employ 
fewer additional security devices. The subhypotheses related to the same 
items as the second major set. The relationships indicated r/ere not strong, 
but it was concluded that crop insurance participation tends to be high 
where debts are high and where reserves, both physical and monetary, are 
low. The su{^ gestion also vras that the various cultural practices are em­
ployed along vd-th crop insurance. 
It was concluded that farmers are sensitive to the conditions of 
extreme yield variability and hold a strong preference for security, espe­
cially when it is threatened. In these circumstances they vrill make ad­
justments in order to preserve their solvency even at the expense of a cer­
tain degree of long-run income possibilities. However, they will not em­
ploy a particular security technique regardless of its cost but will attempt 
to substitute alternative means or employ several together. 
Deficiencies noted in the high-risk area were the lack of sufficient 
capital, the lack of a sound base for livestock diversification, the limita­
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tions of tifiQ federal crop insurance program, and lack of farmer education. 
Research is needed to bring improvements in these conditions and to provide 
farmei's with information to enable them to maximize their goals more effi­
ciently bji making more rational choices and decisions. With e^ qjlicit rec­
ognition of the co-existence of the goal of security vi'ith the goal of in­
come, a more useful research program should be possible. 
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Budget Bureau Wo. 1^ 0-52^ 7 County-
Approval expires 12/3l/$2 Date 
Enumerator 
Farm Wo. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
in cooperation ivith 
NORTH DAKOTA AGRICULTfJRAL EXPERIUffiMT STATIOW 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Production Risks and Crop Insurance 1952 
1, Farm operator: Name 
P.O. address 
Legal location of farmstead 
Q S T R M 
2. Wo. years on this farm. 3. How many years have yon been farming^ . 
I4, Size and tenure: Total acres operated Acres owned 
Acres rented 
Rental terms 
6. Are you or your \;-ife related to the landlord? Yes N^o 
76 
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I. Farm Organization (Land Use and Livestock) 
Acres ovmed Acres rentedl Total acres 
10. IVheat S 
11. Oats 
12. Barley 
13. Flax 
II4.. Corn 
15. 
16. 
17. Seeded pasture and hay 
18. Summerfallow 
19. Wild hay and native pasture ! 
20. Waste, roads, farmstead, etc. i 
21. Total land operated (check with //li) 
1 
On hand now Sold during On hand now Sold during 
last 12 mo, last 12 mo. 
22. Horses 29. Other pigs 
23. Milk cows 30. Ewes & rams 
2U. Other cows 31. Lambs 
25. 2-yr.-olds 32. Laying flock 
26. Yearlings 33. Other chickens 
27. Calves 3h. Other poultry 
28. Sows & gilts 
77 
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II« Insurance 
Crop Insurance 
Uo, Have you ever had federal crop insurance on this farm since 19UU? Yes No_ 
Ul. Were you ever contacted personally for the purpose of having you take out 
crop insurance? Yes No 
Us. Have you ever attended meetings where the federal crop insurance plan was 
discussed and promoted? Yes No 
U3. Have you ever had hail insurance on this farm since 19UU? Yes No 
What was your average yield in 19^ 1 for: 
Wheat bu./acre Oats bu»/acre 
Flax bu./acre Barley bu./acre 
Compared to last year's wheat yield do you expect your yields on this farm 
in the long run will average - belovir this 
- above this 
- about the same 
14.6. Have you kept yield records on this farm? Yes 
table in ^ U?) 
No (If yes, enter in 
U7» If answers to either //UO or is yes check details in this table. 
Year Yield 
bu./acre 
Fed, Crop Insurance Hail Insurance 
check partic,>'' 
Indemnity 
check mark*"' 
Participation 
S-State,P-Private 
Indemnity 
check mark/ 
1952 
Wheat 
19^1 
1950 
19h9 
19U8 
19h7 
19U6 
19U5 
78 
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it?. Continued 
Year Yield 
bu./acre 
Fed. Crop Insurance Hail Insurance 
check partic 
Indemnity 
check mark/ 
Participation 
S-S tat e,P-Private 
Indemnity 
check mark,/ 
1952 
Flax 
19^1 
1950 
19U9 
19U8 
19U7 
19U6 
19U5 
Other crop (name) 
1952 ! 
1951 
1950 
19U9 
19lt8 
19i;7 
19U6 
19U5 f 
1952 X 
Multiple 
X X 
1951 X X X 
1950 X 1 i X X 
79 
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NOTE: Classify" on basis of participation in federal crop insurance since 'blj.. 
Check here 
If he has crop insurance in 19^ 2 complete section A ("Haves") 
If he has participated previously but not in 19^ 2 complete section 
B ("Drops") 
If operator has never subscribed, complete section C ("Nevers") 
A. "Haves" (for those who have - federal crop insurance in 19^ 2) 
50. Complete a column for each indemnity received as indicated in Ii7 (If more 
space needed, use back of page) 
(a) Year 
(b) Crop 
(hail or 
(c) Type of insurance crop) 
(d) Amount of indemnity (total $) 
(e) Acreage concerned (acres) 
(f) Final yield (bu./acre) 
(g) Your appraisal of adjuster's 
estimate, check; too high 
too low 
about right 
(h) Did you have any complaints with regard to provisions such as reseeding to 
substitute crops, harvesting, etc.? (Explain in detail giving year and 
crop in each case) 
5l. The basic premium and coverage for this area for 1952 is: Premium 
Coverage (to be filled in by enumerator) 
IThat is your premium and coverage? Premium Coverage 
80 
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$ 2 ,  How do you feel this basic coverage, based on approximately 60% of the county 
or area average yield, suits your farm? 
Coverage is too high ; too low ; about right . 
Explain 
53- How do you feel tlie basic premium, based on average loss experience of the 
county or area, suits your farm? 
Premium too high ; too low j about right * 
Explain  ^
Do you have an individual reserve built up? Yes No 
If so, what was the amount of your premium reduction in 19^ 2? 
Did.' you ever have an indemnity coming and not apply for it? Yes No 
(Give details) 
56, Vftiat are the reasons why you feel you need or v/ant the program? (check most 
important) 
Protect investment and get exjDenses back 
Expectation of lower prices 
I believe in the insurance principle 
-7- 81 
57« If the crop insurance program were to cease, would you make any changes in 
your farm business to make up for it in order to protect yourself against 
poor crops? Yes No If yes, what changes? (Qieck most important) 
Keep more livestock 
Try to enlarge the ..farm 
Reduce size of farm 
Practice more suromerfallov;^  
Try to keep larger reserves of cash , feed , seed • 
B. "Drops" (for those who have been in the program but not in 19^2) 
60. Complete a column for each indemnity received as indicated in U? (If more 
space needed, use back of page) 
(a) Year 
(b) Crop_ 
t,hail or 
(c) Type of insurance crop) 
(d) Amount of indemnity (total $) 
(e) Acreage concerned (acres) 
(f) Final yield (bu./acre) 
(g) Your appraisal of adjuster's 
estimate, check: too high 
too low 
about right 
(h) Did you have any complaints with regard to provisions suchas reseedlng to 
substitute crops, harvesting, etc.? (Explain in detail giving year and 
crop in each case) 
-8-
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61 Why did you drop out? (check most important) (Refer to particular items 
in 60 if possible) 
D^issatisfied vdth adjustments: yield adjustment 
substitute crop regulation 
harvesting regulation 
Premium too high 
CoveragGs too low 
R^ely on other means of security: livestock 
fallo^ ir 
reserves 
Prefer to take a chance 
62, The basic coverage for yoitr farm based on approximately of the county or 
area acreage yield is (To be filled in and stated by the enumerr 
ator). 
How do you feel this coverage suits your farm? 
Coverage too high ; too low ; about right 
Expla in 
63. The basic premium for your farm based on the average loss experiBnce for the 
county or area is (To be filled in and stated by the enumerator). 
Hovf do you feel this premium suits your farm? 
Premium too high ; too lovf ; about right . 
Explain 
83 
61+, Vftiy do you feel you don't need it or don't v^ ait it? (check most important) 
Need it but can't afford it 
Have decided to employ other practices (What:) 
My yields are better than average. 
6^ , At the present level of coverage, hov^  low vrould the premium have to be to 
get you back in the program? 
66. Are there other conditions that would persuade you to start again? Yes_ 
No . If yes, what conditions? (check most important) 
If I could not keep livestock 
If I lost my reserves 
If field insurance were introduced 
If coverages were raised 
If expensive illness str^ ick the family 
Change in regulations What? 
67. Since you dropped out, have you made any changes in your farm business to 
protect yourself against going broke on account of poor crops? (check most 
important) 
Hail insurance Reserves 
Livestock Farm size 
_Willing to take chances 
-xu-
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C. "Nevers" (for those v/ho have never participated in the crop insurance program) 
70. Why do you feel you don't need or want crop insurance? (check most important-) 
Premium too high for the coverage 
Coverage too low to be worth while 
Feel I can take care of my ovm risk by 
My yields are better than average 
fallow 
livestock 
reserves_ 
farm size 
71. The basic coverage for your farm based on approximately 60^ 0 of the county 
or area average yield is (To be filled in and stated by the 
enumerator). How do you fe^  this coverage suits your farm? 
Coverage too high j too low ; about right . 
Explain 
72. The basic premium for your farm based on the average loss experience for the 
county or area is (To be filled in and stated by the enumerator). 
How do you feel this premium suits your farm? 
Premium too high ; too low ; about right . 
Explain 
73. At the present lovel of coverage hov; low vrould the premium have to be to get 
you interested in subscribing? 
7U. Are there other conditions that -would make you want to subscribe? Yes No 
If yes, what conditions? (check most important) 
If I could not keep livestock through poor health, 3a ck of help, etc. 
If I lost my reserves 
If field insurance were introduced 
"Change in local administration 
If expensive illness struck the family 
Change in regulations Vilhat? 
55 
Multiple Insurance A. If county does not have multiple insurance 
80, Are you familiar with the multiple insurance plan? Yes Mo . 
(If "Yes, enumerator will review plan.) 
(If "No", enumerator will explain plan.) 
81. Which feature would seem most important to you in considering whether or not 
you would be in favor of the plan? (check most important) 
LoAver premiums 
Indemnities probably smaller and received less often 
82. Do you think you v;ould prefer this plan to the straight commodity type as 
now provided in this county? Yes No Do not vfant any insurance 
83. Would you prefer insurance (a) at lov/ cost vYhich pays an inderchity ohlyiin 
the vrorst years? 
or (b) do you prefer to pay higher rates for higher 
coverages? 
B, If county has multiple crop insurance 
85. Are you familiar vj-ith the multiple insurance plan? Yes No 
(If "Yes", enumerator will review plan.) 
(If "No", enumerator will explain plan.) 
86. As you see it, what are the advantages of the multiple plan over the commodity 
insurance? (check most important) 
Lower premium rates 
Covers the whole farm 
87. What are the disadvantages? (check most important) 
Indemnities not so large or paid so often 
Failure in one crop may be offset by fair yield in another 
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88, On the whole, do you prefer it to the straight commodity type? Yes Mo 
Don't like any crop insurance 
89. Do you prefer insurance (a) at low cost which pays an indemnity only in the 
vrarst years? 
or (b) would you prefer to pay higher rates for higher 
coverages? 
Additional Criticisms and Suggestions (to be answered by all) 
90. As you may Icnov/, the county is divided into several sub-areas, according to 
risk and producivity in which different rates apply. Do you have any 
criticism of this? (check most important) 
Individual farm basis more equitable 
Person with better land should not have more favorable rates. 
Too many border cases where line doesn't fit. 
91, At present you have to insure all of the crop under one ovmership unit. 
Would you prefer to have the insurance on a field basis, although it would 
certainly increase the premium rates? Yes No 
Why? 
92. In 19^ 1 the premium and coverage, on the basis of 60^  (assumed to be the 
amount of your costs in the crop) of the 20-year average yield, for your area 
was and (to be filled in beforehand). Would you prefer a 
different level of insurance, say J^ O^  or 1$%1 The following schedule of 
rates might apply to your area; 
Coverage as percent 
of average yield 
(percent) 
(Note: table v/ill be UO 
completed in advance 
from data pertaining 0^ 
to the particular 
area.) 60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
Coverage Premium 
(bushels) (bushels) 
Which of these alternatives,, if any, would you consider as a better proposi­
tion? 
-13- 87 
93. Present crop insurance rates are based on past experience. Do you believe: 
This is justified 
Future yields will average higher? 
Future yields vfill average loy;er? 
91;. Do you have any additional criticisms regarding any aspect of the crop 
insurance program? 
9$. Can you make any suggestions for improving the program to make it more 
acceptable and more useful to the farmers? 
Other Insurance 
98. liVhat other types of insurance do you carry? 
Type Amount 
Fire 
Life 
Accident, . ............ 
Auto 
Farm Liability 
III. Farm Practice 
100. Vilhat crop sequence or rotation do you follow? 
Why? 
101. Do you^ practice the clear fallow method? Yes No If yes, Vlhy? (check 
most important) 
To control weeds 
To conserve moisture 
-11^ - 88 
102. Do you practice stubble mulching (surface cultivation)? Yes No 
If yes, why? (check most important) ' 
f 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Cheaper; takes less power W^ot a black surface 
'Quicker; operations more timely Soil doesn't warm as fast 
I]Conserves moisture Doesn't dry as fast in spring 
"Control soil-drifting 
103. How much fertilzer did you use tliis year? last year?_ 
on what crops?  ^
Why? Increases yield 
iiakes crop earlier 
10l+. Do you think fertilizer helps in dry years? Yes No 
105. How many acres did you spray for weeds this year? last year? 
106. Do your practice stripcropping? Yes No 
Why or why not? 
107. ITiat are your reasons for keeping your other enterprises, livestock, ete. 
(see faim organization)? (check most important) 
For home use 
To make fuller use of time 
To utilize non-plowable pasture 
To provide income in case of poor crop 
108. (a) If operator has crop insurance ask: Would you keep more livestock 
if there were no crop insurance program? Yes No 
(b) If operator does not have crop insurance ask: Would you keep less live­
stock if you could get some acceptable crop insurance? Yes No 
109, If a complete drought were apparent in July would you; 
Keep your breeding stock and try to get nev7 sources of feed? 
Reduce your breeding stock down to your feed supply? 
D^rav;- on feed reserves to get through a year of complete drought? 
110. Do you have any additional practices that you use to protect yourself against 
going broke on account of poor crops? (Give details) 
-1$-Q9 
IV. Reserves, Capital and Credit 
120, How much of the 1951^  or earlier, crop do you have on hand now? 
Item 
Cash grain. 
Feed g ain. 
Hay. 
Oat bundles 
Trench silage 
Amount 
Is this carry-over; 
Normal 
Less than 
normal 
More than 
normal 
If not normal, what 
is your usual practice 
121, Vi/hat are the chief reasons for carrying these reserves? (check most impor­
tant) 
_To spread income tax 
_To spread income 
_Protection against crop failure 
122. Are these reserves sufficient to carry your feeding and farming operations 
to 1953 harvest? Yes Uo 1951; harvest? Yes No 
123. Do you have any source of feed that is reliable in a drought year such as 
slough hay, etc.? Yes No 
12l|.. If you had a total crop failure this year could you live through the year 
and get your next crop off without borrowing? Yes No 
If no, where and how much would you have to borrow ? 
lhat for in particular? 
125. In recent years did you borrow any money for seed, feed, fuel, etc., to get 
the crop in and harvested and carry your livestock? Yes No K yes, 
when?^  How much? /^ilhy? 
126, Do you have a mortgage on your farm? Yes No If yes. How much? 
Total amount ; annual payment . Does it 
have any postponement or prepayment provisions? (Give details) 
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127. Could you get additional long-term credit? Yes No If yes, up to 
how much? • • • 
128. Do you have any chattel mortgages or machinery debts? Yes No If 
yes, how much? 
129. Could you get additional short-term credit? Yes No If yes, up to 
how much? 
130. How much in the way of debt payments do you have to meet this year? 
(126) ; (128) ; other current debts 
131. How much of this would be postponable if your next crop should be a poor one? 
132, Could you get backing from relatives in case of crop failure emergency? 
Yes Mo 
133. Do you think you could stand poor crops better if you had a larger farm? 
Yes No . If yes, why don't you get mox-e land? (check most importaht) 
Suitable land nearby not available 
Help is too scarce 
Lack of funds 
Don't want to get into debt 
I3U. Machinery and Equipment Ovmed Item Size Age Estimated Value 
Tractor 
Truck 
Auto 
Combine 
Swather 
Thresher 
Hay and baling equip. 
Other (total) 
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135. other assets: 
CSV of Life Insurance 
Cash on hand or in the bank 
Government bonds 
Other 
136. Do you have any other assets or income that you could call on in a poor 
crop year? Yes Mo 
V» General 
lUO. Under present conditions, how much gross income would you need to meet: 
(a) necessary operating costs  ^
(b) minimum necessary family living $ 
(c) annual debt payments |
Total $ 
llil. How much would you be willing to pay per year for an insurance plan that 
would guarantee that your income would be great enough to cover: 
(a) necessary operating costs $ 
- 2 per cent 
- 5 per cent 
-10 per cent 
(Note: enumerator shall compute the percentages of the amount in II4.O (a) 
and state the probes in dollar amounts) 
(b) total minimum costs (refer to total in llj.0) $ 
- 2 per cent $ 
- $ per cent '  ^
-10 per cent .1^  
(Note: enumerator shall compute the percentages of the total amount in 
lUO and state the probes in dollar amounts). 
lU2« Were rain-making contracts offered in your community this jrear? 
Did you subscribe? 
Would you subscribe if they v/ere offered? 
Explain 
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lli3» Size of household: Husband 
(at home) 
Vfife 
Sons' ages 
Daughters' ages 
Others at home 
lUh. Other dependents away fiom home that you are supporting? 
ll),5« Have you had any large medical or hospital expenses in last 3 years? 
Yes No 
lU6. Your age? 
lU7. Your national origin?^  
